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Abstract 
The underlying premise of this work is that to use the terms ‘secular’ and 
‘religion’ without proper definitions and methodological insight is an academic 
mistake of the highest order. In light of such an assertion, this dissertation 
provides a clear definition of both the term ‘secular’, and therefore 
‘secularisation’, and ‘religion’. In regards to ‘religion’, a definition is drawn from 
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s ‘Social Constructivism’ to conclude that a 
‘religion’ is a legitimating narrative that relates the order of the world to an 
ultimate reality. In regards to ‘secular’ and ‘secularisation’, the dissertation 
contends itself firstly with what the process of ‘secularisation’ entails. In doing 
such, the conclusion is reached that reality, in a collective with multiple different 
world-views, is ordered by an over-arching ‘metanarrative’ that is more 
objective than the individual world-views. In light of such an assertion, it is 
concluded that ‘secularisation’ represents the shifting from the traditional 
Western metanarrative of Christianity to the metanarrative of modernity. A 
detailed inquiry in Chapter Four asserts that the metanarrative of modernity is 
one in which the world is believed to operate in a causally mechanistic fashion, 
in the sense that phenomena are explained by the employment of ‘natural laws’ 
such as Newton’s Laws. As such, a ‘secular religion’ is a legitimating narrative, in 
the Berger and Luckmann sense of the phrase, which is ordered by the 
metanarrative of modernity. The final chapter contends itself with applying such 
a definition to both the classical economic doctrine of Adam Smith, and modern 
neoliberal economic doctrine. In light of such an endeavour, the dissertation 
derives a clear model for what a ‘secular religion’ is.  
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Introduction: The Rules of the Game 
In the wake of the current European Debt Crisis, the technocrat has taken on the 
role of the messiah. They alone know the rules of the world and, therefore, they 
alone can help us appease the market. They tell countries, such as Greece and 
Spain, that they must show the world that they are playing by the rules in order 
to regain the faith of the market. These countries must make deep austerity cuts 
and sacrifice a generation to poverty simply because the market wills it. The 
international multilateral financial regulators, such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, approve of the sacrifice and believe 
that it will appease the markets. With these forces in agreement, it naturally 
follows that if the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy Greece and Spain) follow the 
commands from above, they will regain economic prosperity.1 The markets will 
flock to their bonds, as they are doing the right things to restore the faith. This 
evidently has not transpired. Greek bonds still are paying high yields, which 
make any form of debt unsustainable for the country.2 The question we should 
be asking in the face of this is: Why has this happened? Greece played the game, 
they implemented austerity and, in theory, they should have regained the faith of 
the market. Either, Greece has not stuck to the rules, which is evidently not the 
case, or those rules themselves are flawed. 
 
What we have at this current juncture is a moment in history where the 
pervasive system of economic doctrine has revealed that it is no longer accurate, 
and maybe never was. The world is not operating along the correct lines and 
                                                        
1 Martin Feldstein, “The Failure of the Euro: The Little Currency That Couldn’t,” 
Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (2012): 105-116. 
2 Sebastian Mallaby, “Europe’s Optional Catastrophe,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 
(2012): 6-10. 
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therefore the system has ceased to be self-evident. Moments such as this are 
truly invaluable for an analysis of humanity’s propensity to order beliefs under 
paradigms that we take to be ‘true’. The priests of the current economic 
paradigm stand by their remedies, as if there system of beliefs represents the 
fundamental ‘truth’ of existence. The problem with this position lays in the lack 
of recognition that humans collectively tend to defend their own dogmatically- 
bound realities. In the same way that Roman Catholic Christianity, during the 
Reformation, failed to recognise the ludicrous nature of a monopoly on reality, so 
too does dogmatic economics. As was the case during the Enlightenment when 
thinkers such as Spinoza and Locke decried the dogmatism of normative 
Christianity, a point is coming where it is necessary for humanity to reflect on 
the paradigms of ‘truth’ in which we construct our personal narratives. Instead 
of retreating into blind faith and hoping that the holders of ‘truth’ will save us, a 
broader recognition of the soft edges of our paradigms needs to be recognised. 
Rather than seek a definitive order to reality, our conceptions need to be 
malleable and able to extend. It is time for Gianni Vattimo’s notion of ‘the 
democratic principle of charity’ to play a part in our deciphering of the world.3 
 
This dissertation concerns itself with the notion of conceptual paradigms and the 
ordering of our reality. Where traditional ‘religion’ once occupied such roles, we 
now have developed ‘secular’ models to serve the purpose, with economics being 
the decisive example of such a system. Not only does economics exert a 
dominant force in the modern mode of ordering reality, it also has, when all post-
                                                        
3 Gianni Vattimo, A Farewell to Truth, trans. William McCuaig (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2011 [2009]), 36. 
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Enlightenment anti-religious bias is stripped away, aspects that are 
characteristic of traditional religion. It has belief in a transcendental force, in the 
form of the market. It has a church and a priest, these being the economic think-
tank or the university, and the academically trained economist. Furthermore, it 
even makes metaphysical claims about the ‘true’ nature of the world. This 
dissertation will elaborate on these themes in order to further the understanding 
of paradigmatic systems of understanding reality, which we will assert are 
fundamentally intertwined with ‘religion’.   
 
In light of such statements, this dissertation will present a clear and well-defined 
conception of ‘secular religion’. Through this exercise, an adequate treatment of 
reality’s ordering paradigms, in the form of both ‘secular’ and ‘traditional’ 
religion, will be provided. The first part will focus on defining what ‘religion’ is 
and why such a definitional paradigm should be employed. The first chapter of 
this section will deal with the concept of definitive ‘truth’ and how it met its end 
at the hands of Heidegger’s re-conception of Being in the form of Dasein.4 Using 
the philosophical conclusions regarding the transient nature of ‘truth’, it will 
then be demonstrated that Berger and Luckmann’s ‘Social Constructivism’, as 
outlined in both The Social Construction of Reality (1967) and The Sacred Canopy 
(1967), is the most adequate model for describing religion in today’s post-
metaphysical world. Following this, the concept of the ‘secular’ and 
‘secularisation’ will be reimagined employing a model formulated in the tradition 
of this constructivist definition of religion. Such a model will employ the concept 
                                                        
4 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1996), 7. 
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that complex collectives of people, which contain multiple different world-views, 
are ordered under a shared ‘metanarrative’, and that ‘secularisation’ merely 
represents the shifting away from the traditional Christian ‘metanarrative’. As 
such, at the conclusion of the first part, ‘religion’, ‘secular’, and ‘secularisation’ 
will be clearly defined concepts.  
 
The second part of this dissertation will seek to clarify the concept of ‘secular 
religion’ specifically, and the role that the metanarrative of modernity plays in 
the formulation of such systems. Thus, Chapter Four will identify the 
metanarrative of modernity, as being a mechanistic perspective on reality, and 
account for its rise. Following this, Chapter Five will, by analysing Adam Smith’s 
classical economic paradigm and the modern neoliberal system, demonstrate 
that economics is a ‘secular religion’. Through doing such, a fundamental insight 
into the nature of our ‘secular’ ordering paradigms, or ‘religions’, shall be gained. 
 
At the conclusion of this undertaking, the dissertation will have achieved two 
particular outcomes. Firstly, it will have provided clear definitions for what 
‘secular’, ‘secularisation’, ‘religion’, and ‘secular religion’ are. As these terms 
become wedded to a greater extent with the modern academic enquiry of 
‘religion’, it is important to strive in providing clear definitions as to allow them 
to continue being of use as methodological tools. Secondly, this dissertation will 
shed light on the transient nature of our ordering paradigms, with the aim of 
providing an academic argument against dogmatic world-views. Through 
looking back to the violence of the Reformation, the results of dogmatic 
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adherence to particular truth claims should be evident.5 Such affirmations of 
dogma, whether it is to ‘secular’ or traditionally religious models, are firmly 
wedded to violent conflict. Through reflexivity of the horizons in which we all 
must exist, hopefully the dogmatic quests of the past can be avoided and the 
principle of democratic charity can truly be embraced. If not, we are destined to 
repeat history in the name of our perceived certainties.   
  
                                                        
5 Andrew Cunningham and Ole Peter Grell, The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: 
Religion, War, Famine and Death in Reformation Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 1.   
  9
Part One: Religion in a Post-Metaphysical World 
Chapter One: The Current State of ‘Truth’ 
Introduction 
This dissertation will paint one possible model of religion, and its role in the way 
we come to understand reality. If it is to propose that our reality comes about 
through conceptual paradigms, then the logical first step for such a task would be 
with a reinterpretation of the foundations of our Western paradigmatic 
narratives. Further, bound within such a statement is a need to assert that the 
construction of such paradigms is in no way transcendental, and therefore 
universally true. As such, this section will argue, using the philosophical 
deconstruction of metaphysics undertaken by Nietzsche and Heidegger, that 
‘truth’ is a historically inherited social consensus. In making such an assertion, 
this section will provide the philosophical grounding from which the rest of the 
dissertation’s undertaking stems. 
 
Western thought, since the time of Plato, has searched for a ‘truth’ to reality. 6 As 
such, our very conception of Logos is based on the notion that there is a 
fundamental truth to be sought. What has resulted from this is an inherent 
ideological position that finds its articulation in Western metaphysics.7 For Plato 
it was in the ‘essence’ of things, Kant saw it in ‘transcendental reason’ and Hegel 
saw it in the ‘spirit.’8 Now, in a world that has hitherto been constructed around 
this ideological position, we have arrived at a point where these conceptions of 
                                                        
6 Santiago Zabala, The Remains of Being: Hermeneutic Ontology After Metaphysics 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), xiv. 
7 Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking? (New York: HarperCollins, 1968), 
184.  
8 Zabala, The Remains of Being, xiii. 
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‘truth’ no longer hold valid. In the wake of a mechanised reality where morality 
is apparently relativistic, Nietzsche and Heidegger contend that metaphysics has 
run its course and has, in regards to its traditional formulation, led to its own 
demise.9 As such, if Nietzsche’s conclusions are truly taken to heart, it is no 
longer possible to believe in an objective truth that transcends the historical 
opening.10 This section will seek to take the implication of Nietzsche and 
Heidegger’s deconstruction of metaphysics to heart and, thereby, demonstrate 
that the concept of ‘truth’ is a value-laden assertion.11 Therefore, using 
Nietzsche’s re-conception of the nature of Western Metaphysics and Heidegger’s 
rethinking of Being, this section will succinctly summarise the state of ‘truth’ in 
today’s intellectual world.  
Nietzsche’s “Revaluation of all Values” 
Nietzsche’s philosophical positions have had a profound influence on the 
conception of ‘truth’ in the twentieth century. His ‘philosophising with a 
hammer’ has torn down walls with its unbridled intent to deride domineering 
intellectual power bases.12 As such, if we are to engage in a rethinking of values, 
as that proposed in this dissertation, Nietzsche’s endeavour must be given the 
consideration that it truly warrants. Therefore, this section will analyse 
Nietzsche’s attempt to enact a “revaluation of all values,” in the form of his 
system of ‘nihilism’, and contend with its implications for objective ‘truth’.13 
 
                                                        
9 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power (New York: Random House, 1967), 3.  
10 Gianni Vattimo, Beyond Interpretation: The Meaning of Hermeneutics for 
Philosophy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 84. 
11 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 8. 
12 Louis Blond, Heidegger and Nietzsche: Overcoming Metaphysics (London: 
Continuum Publishing, 2010), 99. 
13 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 8. 
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Nietzsche’s ferocious critique of metaphysics begins to take on coherence in 
Human, All Too Human (1878). In this text Nietzsche takes his first true steps 
away from the philological training of his earlier years and moves steadily 
towards his famed philosophical positions.14 The most important thesis of the 
text, in terms of Nietzsche’s later development, comes in the first aphorism. In it, 
Nietzsche launches his revaluation by challenging the very foundations of 
Western thought. He rejects the conception of a ‘true world’ by observing that 
European thought has made the mistake of believing that its foundations lie in 
transcendental truths rather than in the historical philosophical legacy.15 This 
becomes obvious when Nietzsche asks the question: 
[H]ow can something arise from its opposite-for example, reason from 
unreason, sensation from lifeless, logic from illogical...truth from error? 
Until now, metaphysical philosophy has overcome this difficulty by 
denying the origin of the one from the other, and by assuming for the 
more highly valued things some miraculous origin, directly from out of 
the heart and essence of the “thing itself.”16 
For Western thought, this belief in a transcendental origin has allowed societally 
ordained conceptions of the world to be impervious from critique or reflection, 
as their, apparently, transcendental nature assures that they represent the way 
things ‘truly’ are. In order to undermine such claims, Nietzsche utilises 
“historical philosophy.”17 This method allows him to account for the 
                                                        
14 Gianni Vattimo, Nietzsche: An Introduction (London: Continuum Publishing, 
2002), 10. 
15 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human (New York: Penguin, 1994 [1878]), 
1. 
16 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, 1. 
17 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, 1. 
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development of specific values in Western thought, or, in his own words, attain a 
“chemistry of morals.”18 He is thus drawn to conclude that, in fact, the opposites 
he mentions are one in the same.19 Therefore, if we accept Nietzsche’s conclusion 
that the foundations of logic are not transcendental but are in fact formed out of 
their opposites, does not this mean that Western logic and reason are in fact 
contradictory in their very nature? This initial attack represents Nietzsche’s first 
step in the direction of his theory of nihilism.20  
 
In the years following the publication of Human, All Too Human (1878), 
Nietzsche develops his initial attempt at a ‘chemical analysis’ into a full 
philosophical system, in the form of ‘nihilism.’ The central premise of his system 
lies in the observation that “the highest values devalue themselves” as they can 
never live up to their claims of being ‘eternal truths.’21 Nietzsche states that, 
since all of Western thought has been founded on ‘values’ or ‘myths’ under the 
guise of eternal truth, our deeply held conceptions of the nature of existence are 
now rendered meaningless.22 What comes about once this devaluation has 
occurred is ‘nihilism.’ For Nietzsche there are two stages of ‘nihilism,’ “passive 
nihilism,” which is characteristic of a “rescission of the power of the spirit,” and 
“active nihilism,” which empowers humanity on their way to becoming the 
“overmen.”23 Passive nihilism, which represents the first stage, occurs when 
                                                        
18 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, 1. 
19 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, 1. 
20 Vattimo, Nietzsche: An Introduction, 61.  
21 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 9. 
22 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 10.   
23 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 17; Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
(New York: Penguin, 1966 [1883-1885]), 12.  
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humanity attains the knowledge that metaphysical categories are untenable.24 
Following this recognition, “the strength of the spirit may be worn out, 
exhausted, so that previous goals and values have become incommensurate and 
no longer believed.”25 What comes about in this state is an age of confusion and 
meaninglessness, humanity is set a drift in a world that no longer carries 
meaning and, as such, is left with a weakened spirit. Nietzsche’s proposed 
solution to this era of confusion is “active nihilism.”26 “Active nihilism” is 
characteristic of a state where humanity channels this newfound 
meaninglessness of existence into a liberating force.27 Now that humanity is free 
from historical structures, we are at a point where we can create our values 
anew and, through this process, truly recognise the temporal nature of such 
values.28 
 
While Nietzsche’s theories never really escape the spectre of Plato’s metaphysics, 
at the very least he achieves a rethinking of what, in the Western tradition, has 
been dubbed ‘true.’ 29 According to Nietzsche, our conceptions of existence stem 
from metaphysical categories that can never live up to there claim to 
transcendental truth. As such, we are left in a world where truth does not 
represent any ultimate order of things. According to Nietzsche, all we have is a 
“pure conflictual interplay of force and power, a conflict among interpretations 
                                                        
24 Blond, Heidegger and Nietzsche, 113. 
25 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 18. 
26 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 18. 
27 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 18. 
28 Blond, Heidegger and Nietzsche, 114. 
29 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche: Volume Three and Four (New York: Harper 
Collins, 1991 [1956]), 185. 
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with no mooring in reality,” in the form of his theory of metaphysics as a ‘Will to 
Power.’30 
Martin Heidegger: Being and Truth 
Martin Heidegger, with his radical rethinking of the nature of existence, 
continues along the path on which Nietzsche fell short. For Heidegger, like 
Nietzsche, metaphysical categories have arisen out of the Greek historical 
philosophical legacy.31 Although, Heidegger proposes that Nietzsche has not fully 
escaped Platonic philosophical groundings, as his ‘Will to Power’ is still 
representative of a metaphysical mode of thought.32 This is the case because, if 
our interpretations are informed by conflicts of force, then we are still making a 
statement about the finite nature of existence, or the Being of beings.33 
Heidegger takes Nietzsche’s attempt at a “revaluation of all values” and drags it 
into, what he considers to be, the most important realm of philosophy, the 
questioning of Being.34 As such, if we are to adequately analyse the concept of 
‘truth,’ it is necessary to confront the ramifications of Heidegger’s rejection of the 
notion of Being as presence.35 
                                                        
30 Vattimo, A Farewell to Truth, 4. 
31 Heidegger, Being and Time, 1. 
32 Heidegger, Nietzsche: Volume Three and Four, 187. 
33 Heidegger, Nietzsche: Volume Three and Four, 189.  
34 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2000), 38 
35 It must be noted that the difference between ‘being’ and ‘Being’ is constituted 
by the former being the noun, such as a ‘being’, and the latter being the verb, in 
the sense that it is the way you experience reality. Used in a sentence, we could 
say, for the former, “I am a being” and for the latter, “I experience that painting in 
that way due to my Being”. Implicit in the object, being, is the lack of recognition 
of the ontological difference, or a lack of recognition of the fact that there is no 
right way to experience reality. Further, Heidegger’s use of the word Dasein has a 
somewhat different meaning, hence the translators employment of the German 
word rather than simply utilising ‘Being’. Dasein refers to the human manner of 
Being as a shared characteristic amongst all humans no matter their historical 
  15
 
In Heidegger’s magnum opus, Being and Time (1927), his radical rethinking of 
the nature of Being begins with identifying the source of the current conception 
of existence. He claims that our current conception of Being, meaning simply ‘to 
be present’, stems from Plato and Aristotle’s ontological positions.36 He states 
that: 
The outward evidence of this…is the determination of the meaning of 
being as parousia or ousia, which ontologically and temporally means 
“presence” [“Anwesenheit”]. Beings are grasped in their being as 
“presence”; that is to say, they are understood with regard to a definite 
mode of time, the present.37 
He concludes that: 
Beings, which show themselves in and for this making present and which 
are understood as genuine beings, are accordingly interpreted with 
regard to the present; that is to say, they are conceived as presence 
(ousia).38 
By exposing that which causes us to forget Being, the inherited ontological 
positions of the Greek philosophers, Heidegger exposes the question of Being as 
one that remains thoroughly unanswered.39 In other words, the ontological 
difference, the difference between Being as a verb and beings as a noun, has been 
                                                                                                                                                              
inheritance. Hence, we all share Daesin while we don’t all have the same mode of 
Being.  
36 Heidegger, Being and Time, 2. 
37 Heidegger, Being and Time, 22. 
38 Heidegger, Being and Time, 23. 
39 Heidegger, Being and Time, 46. 
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neglected and forgotten due to inherited conceptions of Being, which equate the 
two.40 
 
The most profound consequence of Heidegger’s retrieval of Being lies in the 
rethinking of the nature of ‘truth’. This rethinking is brought about due to the 
fact that our inherited ontological position has in-turn produced our mode of 
thought, that being Greek logos.41 This is the case because, if Being is conceived 
of as consisting of ‘that which is present,’ we remain un-reflexive about the 
value-laden categories within which our thought operates. This un-reflexive 
nature inturn produces thought which articulates itself through definitive 
metaphysical truth claims, that being claims that declare to conclusively know 
the nature of reality outside of a historical aperture.42 Heidegger elaborates this 
concept by stating that: 
the history of Western thought begins, not by thinking what is most 
thought provoking, but by letting it remain forgotten… The beginning of 
Western thought is not the same as the origin. The beginning is, rather, 
the veil that conceals the origin…43 
In the above quotation Heidegger declares that by thinking of Being as only ‘that 
which is present’, Western thought, which finds its beginning in Platonic 
metaphysics, has concealed the ontological difference. As such, Heidegger 
                                                        
40 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 14-15. 
41 Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, 155. 
42 Vattimo, A Farewell to Truth, xxxii. 
43 Vattimo, A Farewell to Truth 152. 
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exposes the fact that our conception of ‘truth’ is value-laden and, therefore, does 
not represent correspondence to an objective datum.44  
 
As such, according to Heidegger, ‘truth’ only exists in a particular historical 
opening or “horizon”.45 Therefore, rather than ‘truth’ being representative of a 
correspondence to an objective datum, it represents a historically determined 
consensus, which is reached by individuals from a shared intellectual tradition. 46 
As such, devoid of this ‘horizon’, sensuous experience carries no meaning. 
Rather, we are only able to place meaning on our sensuous experience due to the 
fundamental nature of our Being as humans (Dasein), which is in turn sensuous 
in its nature.47 This concept is confirmed through Heidegger’s assertion that, 
“Human intuition, therefore, is not “sensible” because its affection takes place 
through “sense” organs. Rather, the converse is true.”48 As such, rather than 
intuition being a priori to sensuous experience, intuition is created through our 
sense organs and their “announcing” of the shared state of being, or the state of 
Dasein.49 As such, ‘sensuous objectivity’ does not truly exist because this 
‘objectivity’ only carries meaning within a ‘horizon’ that is determined through 
the sensuous announcing of socially ordained manners of Being.50 
                                                        
44 Vattimo, A Farewell to Truth, 3. 
45 Zabala, The Remains of Being, 94.  
46 Heidegger, Being and Time, 19. 
47 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1973 [1929]), 31. 
48 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 31. 
49 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 32. 
50 Blond, Heidegger and Nietzsche, 15.  
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Conclusion: A Historical Consensus 
The primary message underlying this philosophical discussion is that ‘truth’ is a 
construction built in a particular time, out of a particular stream of thought. 
While it may appear so, the aim here is not to undermine the Western 
intellectual tradition or the things that it has achieved; rather, with this 
discussion, this dissertation’s intent is to lay the foundations for some reflexivity 
on current assertions of ‘truth’. For if we move through the world being un-
reflexive of what we have been told is ‘true’, we will never recognise when the 
way we perceive reality needs to be altered. Problems are not solved if we 
blindly accept the normative doctrine of ‘truth.’ Solutions to problems, such as 
the ‘end of economic growth,’ need to be radical in their very nature. They attack 
at the paradigm of ‘growth’ and, as such, attack what has been previously shown 
to be ‘true’. In conclusion, if our conceptions of ‘truth’ are not universal, in the 
sense that they do not transcend a specific historical period, then the paradigms 
of our reality are also historically determined.  
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Chapter Two: Constructivism – The Transient Religious Model  
Introduction 
In a world where claims to a universal mode of operation have become 
untenable, it is necessary to apply such assertions to the facet of existence that 
has specifically concerned itself with universality for the primary period of 
human existence, religion. In light of the previous chapter, if we are to 
adequately define ‘religion’, we must be wary of the tendency to make absolute 
claims regarding its nature. For instance, if trans-historical truth claims are 
untenable, then hard-line Dawkins-esque Atheism, and the embracing of 
scientific positivism that may come along with it, is just as untenable as the claim 
that there is a God who loves and cares for us. Rather, it is necessary for us to 
recognise both of these claims for what they are. That being, historically 
determined, socially ordained perceptions of reality. 51 As such, we cannot be 
content with treating religion as being different to any other socially held stock 
of knowledge. We, in the academy, must therefore analyse it as a socio-historical 
phenomena rather than subjective confusion or definitive truth.52  
 
While it is recognised that the statement that ‘knowledge is socially determined’ 
is a metaphysical one representing the ‘definitive state of knowledge,’ this 
‘definitive state’ is as transient as we can hope to achieve. For just as Heidegger 
shows us, we can never truly escape our paradigms, as to live and communicate 
we must settle down in them. 53 In order to achieve such a balanced perspective 
                                                        
51 Richard Rorty, “Anticlericalism and Atheism,” in The Future of Religion, ed. 
Santiago Zabala (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 39. 
52 Russell McCutcheon, Critics Not Caretakers: Redescribing the Public Study of 
Religion (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 21. 
53 Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, 137.  
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on religion and knowledge, this chapter will assert that the ‘Social 
Constructivism’ of Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger is the best model for 
defining religion, and therefore for the task of this dissertation. 
The Social Construction of Reality 
Rather than providing a detailed explanation of Berger and Luckmann’s theory, 
only what is necessary for the argument of this dissertation will be recounted. As 
such, this section will provide an overview of the process by which habitualised 
actions take on socially ordained meaning. Through this process, knowledge of 
reality is objectified within a social collective and theoretical mechanisms are 
developed to justify the reality in question. These theoretical mechanisms, or 
‘conceptual machineries’, dictate the fundamental way which we perceive and 
understand our reality. As such, a model will be provided of how our perceptions 
of reality are created through social activity.  
 
The fundamental starting point of the system lies in humanities predisposition to 
sociability, or the manufacturing of complex social networks. Berger and 
Luckmann conclude that humanity does not exist in a world that is absolutely 
given, as many of our biological compatriots in the animal kingdom.54 Our 
particular ‘human self’ is not given at birth but is rather developed as a direct 
relation to our social environment.55 Regarding this, Luckmann and Berger state 
that: 
The genetic presuppositions of the self are, of course given at birth. But 
the self, as it is experienced later as a subjectively and objectively 
                                                        
54 Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A 
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), 47. 
55 Robert V. Kail and John C. Cavanaugh, Human Development: A Life-Span View 
(Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing, 2008), 97-99. 
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recognizable identity, is not. The same social processes that determine 
the completion of the organism produce the self in its particular, 
culturally relative form.56 
So, if the self is not a given finite being but rather a product of its social 
environment, then it follows that the events we experience as our ‘human self’ 
are also created through our social environment.  
 
Berger and Luckmann’s system uses this initial starting point to then develop a 
methodology which details the process by which humanity comes from the point 
of an unformed being, predisposed to sociality, to a member of complex system 
of social knowledge. The initial stage comes in the form of ‘habitualisation’. 
According to Berger and Luckmann, by narrowing the scope of choices, humanity 
is able to relieve “the accumulation of tensions that result from undirected 
drives.”57 In other words, humanity is able to settle down and exist in a world 
that does not require consistent decision-making through the development of 
new process for every task. For example, the individual who may live as part of a 
community that needs to make a fire every night will not have to rethink the 
process every time they go out to collect sticks. They will have a particular 
method and pattern for their process and, as such, will not have to rethink the 
process every time a fire needs to be lit. As such, the process has become 
habitualised and, therefore, the action can be undertaken with minimal mental 
strain.  
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Prior to the construction of a socially shared reality, there is a need for the 
objectification of these habitualised actions. As such, for institutionalisation to 
occur, it is necessary for a collective to have a system of signs that provide an 
objectification of individual experience.58 Language is the most obvious form of 
these types of systems. Further, it is the most malleable, and therefore allows 
more complex manners of objectification. This is the case because, not only does 
language allow the objectification of the experience but it also acts as the house 
of the collective stock of knowledge.59 As such, it allows new knowledge to be 
objectified and incorporated in the existing system. In other words, if we can 
describe it with language, it becomes normalised to our primary social reality.60 
 
Following the objectification of habitualised actions, there is now the possibility 
of social reciprocity towards this habitualisation, which in turn allows it to 
become ‘instiutionalised.’61 According to Berger and Luckmann, the process of 
institutionalisation occurs when “there is a typification of habitualised actions by 
types of actors.”62 Referring back to the previous example of the individual who 
collects sticks for their collective’s fire, now that he or she can objectify their 
stick collecting, they can share this knowledge socially through linguistic 
objectification. If this person’s habitualisation is objectively recognised in the 
collective, then an institution of ‘stick collecting’ is established, where this 
individual occupies the role of the ‘stick collector.’ Now that his or her method 
                                                        
58 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammartology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1997 [1967]), 29. 
59 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 68; Martin Heidegger, 
On the Way to Language (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1971 [1959]), 63 
60 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 26. 
61 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 54.  
62 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 54. 
  23
has been socially objectified, the individual in the role of the ‘stick collector’ is 
the holder of the specific knowledge of efficient stick collecting, in the same way 
that a hunter is the holder of the knowledge of how to effectively hunt.63 Stick 
collecting now goes beyond that one individual, as it is an objectified mode of 
knowledge, or it has become ‘institutionalised.’ 
 
For individuals who were not present at the institution’s creation, or cannot 
draw on its initial meaning, there comes about the problem of continuing the 
objectivity of the institution in question.64 To adequately continue the institution, 
there is a need for it to be legitimated. The self-evident nature of the institution 
in question has ceased to exist and therefore, “in order to restore it…there must 
be “explanations” and justifications of the salient elements of the institutional 
tradition. Legitimation is this process of “explaining” and justifying.”65 According 
to Berger and Luckmann, there are different levels of explanations, which are 
employed in order to legitimise institutions. The first is “incipient legitimation” 
and it becomes “present as soon as a system of linguistic objectifications of 
human experience is transmitted.”66 Such an example would involve the answer, 
if it were enquired ‘why are those people collecting sticks?’, ‘because they are 
stick collectors.’67 The next stage of legitimation is rudimentary theoretical stage. 
Legitimations common to this stage include sayings, proverbs, stories and 
poems.68 Rather than simply responding to the question of ‘why’ with ‘because’, 
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this stage responds with ‘because the aphorism says so’. The next level of 
legitimation is the theoretical level, which involves an institution being 
legitimated by a differentiated body of knowledge.69 In other words, stick 
collecting could be legitimated by a complex theory regarding the necessity of 
such an institution. For example, if stick collecting is not performed in a certain 
manner then the collective’s fire may not cook food properly. This, therefore, 
legitimates the ‘stick collectors’ and their knowledge.  
 
The fourth, and most important for our endeavour, level of legitimation is, what 
Berger and Luckmann term the “symbolic universe.”70 The symbolic universe 
represents a “theoretical tradition that integrate different provinces of meaning 
and encompass the institutional order in a symbolic totality…” and its 
establishment is necessary in order to have “the institutional order…be taken for 
granted in its totality as a meaningful whole.”71 In other words, this form of 
legitimation represents an integration of institutions into a broader enclave of 
meaning. This form of legitimation comes about due to a “process of subjective 
reflection, which, upon social objectivation, lead to the establishment of explicit 
links between the significant themes that have their roots in the several 
institutions.”72  As such, all institutions in the collective are interrelated as they 
all serve a purpose in the symbolic meaning of the socially ordained universe.73 
To continue the examination of stick collectors, a symbolic universe would 
                                                        
69 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 94. 
70 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 95. 
71 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality,95; Berger and 
Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 104. 
72 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 104. 
73 Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion 
(New York: Anchor Books, 1969), 32. 
  25
involve a system that would place the stick collectors in a broader enclave of 
meaning. Say for example, the fires with improperly collected sticks would not 
burn properly because the gods are not satisfied with the manner of stick 
collecting. Here the institution is placed into a broader cosmological system 
where the gods need correctly lit fires to be appeased. This system can extend 
also to all other institutions of the society, such as hunting or childrearing, where 
they all have a set manner due to the will of the gods. Here, the symbolic 
universe would be the supernatural one of the gods. Therefore, symbolic 
universes are the highest form of legitimation, as they “proclaim that all reality is 
humanly meaningful and call upon the entire cosmos to signify the validity of 
human existence.”74 
 
While the symbolic universe itself requires a sophisticated level of theoretical 
contemplation, it may be necessary for further theoretical legitimacy to be 
developed if the primary reality becomes problematic.75 In a society that is 
perfectly functioning, or, in other words, a society where every individual is 
perfectly socialised, the primary symbolic universe will be continuously 
perpetuated as it has reached the status of objective reality. This perfect 
socialisation is inevitably untenable as, since institutions are socially 
constructed, micro social universes can always attain a sufficient level of 
deconstruction as to cause the primary reality to become problematic.76 As such, 
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theoretical systems of universe-maintenance are necessary to protect the 
primary symbolic universe.77  
 
These ‘conceptual machineries’ consist of detailed theoretical systems, which act 
to further legitimate already integrated institutions.78 In other words, they 
provide reasons for why certain institutions sit together and, therefore, 
constitute a symbolic universe.  Examples of such theoretical systems include: 
mythology, theology, philosophy and science.79 According to Berger and 
Luckmann, these systems are ordered in terms of their progression of 
complexity. Regarding mythology they state that, it “is closest to the naïve level 
of the symbolic universe-the level on which there is the least necessity for 
theoretical universe-maintenance beyond the actual positing of the universe in 
question as an objective reality.”80 It must be noted, rather than positing that 
these systems are evolutionary, in the sense that they are progressively moving 
towards ‘truth’, Berger and Luckmann intend the progression to represent an 
increase of theoretical complexity within each system. For example, mythology is 
only dubbed ‘simplistic’ in the sense that it does not contain as many theoretical 
legitimations as other systems such as theology or science. Therefore, it is not 
that one is more correct than the other, but rather, the degree of specialisation of 
the experts of the particular system has increased. As such, with an increase in 
the theoretical framework supporting these systems, the conceptual machinery 
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becomes further detached from the knowledge of the everyday population.81 
When a system of conceptual machinery no longer serves the purpose of 
adequately explaining the symbolic universe, it will strive to rid itself of 
inconsistencies. Through the elaboration of its concepts, mythology will shift into 
the realm of Theology. While mythology involved the constant intervention of 
‘supernatural’ forces in the lives of the collective, due to the increasing 
complexity of theology, there comes about a degree of detachment from the 
world of the ‘Gods’. No longer do the explanations for reality sit so closely to the 
general stock of knowledge. Rather, they sit with the monastic scholar of 
Christendom or the Zoroastrian priest of ancient Persia. Science represents both 
the most extreme detachment from the social stock of knowledge and the 
extreme case of complexity.82 It results in a society where the layperson has very 
little knowledge of the way in which the symbolic universe is held together, as it 
is described through a complex assembly of theoretical assertions.83 Rather than 
actually knowing how the world sits together, the average individual is merely 
assured that the experts remain the designated holders of the nature of reality. 
As such, as long as an individual remains adequately socialised, meaning they 
have objectified the symbolic universe, the conceptual machinery of their 
particular reality will suffice in explaining the institutional order in question. 
Conceptual Machinery and Metaphysical Claims 
The connection between the Heideggerian ‘horizon of truth’ and Berger and 
Luckmann’s ‘symbolic-universe’ and ‘conceptual machinery’ should be clear. For 
Heidegger, the ‘symbolic-universe’ would be representative of the ‘horizon of 
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truth’ and the ‘conceptual machinery’ would represent the metaphysical claim 
regarding the horizon of truth in question. Where Heidegger merely identified 
the historical opening, Berger and Luckmann have provided a detailed 
sociological account of the process by which this “historical aperture” of truth is 
established.84 Take for instance, High medieval Christendom. The ‘symbolic-
universe’, being the interrelation between feudalism and the power of the 
Church, is supported by the metaphysical claim regarding the nature of God, both 
in regards to the divine nature of nobility and the Church being God’s house on 
Earth.85 It can therefore be sufficiently concluded that ‘conceptual machinery’ 
makes definitive metaphysical claims about the nature of reality in order to 
justify the ‘symbolic-universe.’ 
 
If it is safe to say that ‘conceptual machinery’ makes metaphysical claims about 
the nature of reality, then what is the real difference between religion and 
science? Firstly, according to Berger and Luckmann, science’s body of knowledge 
is further removed from the social stock of knowledge than theology’s, in the 
sense that it is only scientists that truly understand the ‘conceptual machinery’ 
that justifies our current reality.86 Secondly, science, apparently, no longer has 
‘supernatural’ elements.87 Yes, these appear to be true in theory, but, in reality, is 
the scientific ‘conceptual machinery’ really any different to a theological one?  
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Berger and Luckmann’s first claim of differentiation, that science is further 
detached from the social stock of knowledge than theology, is misguided. Rather 
than taking to heart their own conclusions, Berger and Luckmann retain a 
certain amount of bias towards the current scientific system of knowledge, as 
shown through their desire to differentiate theology from science.88 When 
contemporary material bias is stripped away, what becomes evident is that both 
these systems have the ability to be as detached from the social stock of 
knowledge as each other. In the Medieval Latin West of the past, theology was in 
essence wholly separate from the social stock of knowledge. In this period, and 
place, the layperson knew little of the intricacies of doctrine; the majority could 
not even read.89 Furthermore, even if they could read their own language, Bibles 
were printed in Latin, which some clergy even struggled to understand.90 An 
example of similar detachment is manifest today in the fact that the majority of 
people today are mathematically illiterate to the point where they cannot 
understand the current theory of matter. As such, it is hardly sufficient to say 
that science is further detached from the social stock of knowledge than theology 
is.   
 
The second of Berger and Luckmann’s differentiable characteristics is the 
removal of ‘supernatural’ aspects from everyday life.91 This declaration foregoes 
the historically determined nature of knowledge, which Berger and Luckmann’s 
endeavour seeks to achieve. For what occupies the realm of the ‘supernatural’ to 
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us, may be wholly natural to an individual from a different historical era. Further, 
at the core of it, things such as electricity and the microwave still occupy the 
realm of the supernatural. This is the case as there is no real difference between 
an apparently supernatural manifestation and a scientific mechanism that is not 
understood. In both cases, the experts of the society inform the layperson that ‘it 
is all ok because the keepers of truth understand the fundamental nature of the 
event.’ Take for instance, the wave-particle duality of light.92 The layperson may 
have solar panels on the roof in order to power their house, regardless of 
whether they understand the inner workings of the photoelectric effect or not.93 
These panels appear just as natural to this individual as praying to God for a 
good year’s harvest did to the individual in the theologically dominated system. 
As long as the experts understand the nature of reality, the ‘symbolic-universe’ 
can be maintained.  
 
As a result, Berger and Luckmann’s distinctions between science and religion are 
arbitrary. At the core of these two variations of ‘conceptual machinery’ are 
metaphysical claims about the nature of reality that are created to legitimate a 
specific ‘symbolic-universe’, or ‘horizon of truth’. Therefore, Berger’s 
interpretation of secularisation, as the stripping of religious elements from 
Western society, is fundamentally misguided.94 Even using the term ‘religious’ in 
such a definition is in itself problematic. Religion is not sui generis; it is merely a 
different way of explaining the paradigm in which we live. Rather than utilising 
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our theological world-view to explain the world around us, we use a scientific 
one, comprised of elements and mathematic descriptions.95 As such, the 
traditional thesis of ‘secularisation’ is problematic, to say the least.   
Conclusion 
What has been presented in this chapter is a model for understanding human 
existence and the act of reality construction, which limits methodological bias in 
regards to the favouring of the modern system of understanding the world. 
Furthermore, through the utilisation of a system that recognises the transient 
nature of truth, it was possible to present a specific definition of the concept of 
‘religion’. Such a definition was devised by utilising the ‘Social Constructivism’ of 
Berger and Luckamann in order to identify ‘religion’ as being a legitimating 
narrative, or ‘conceptual machinery’, that acts to justify a particular order of the 
world. Building on such a conclusion, the chapter identified the implicit bias 
within Berger and Luckmann’s system, in regards to their differentiation 
between the conceptual machineries of science and theology. By doing such, it 
was asserted that science merely represents a modern form of conceptual 
machinery that is not in any major way different from the theological narrative 
of reality.  
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Chapter Three: Secularisation 
Introduction 
This chapter will present a somewhat novel model for the process of 
‘secularisation’, and therefore provide a clear definition for what is meant by the 
adjective ‘secular’.  For if it is the case that, as the previous chapter asserts, our 
current system of conceptual machinery is ‘religious’ in the same way that 
traditional religion is, then there is an urgent need to rethink the concept of 
‘secularisation’. Such a model, regardless of the conceptual paradigm proposed 
in the last chapter, must be wary of a number of errors within various 
formulations of ‘secularisation’. For instance, if this dissertation were to assert 
that ‘secularisation’ represents a shift in the totality of ways that people explain 
the world, we would be as wrong as the ‘all or nothing’ approaches to 
secularisation, this being the paradigm that specifically prophesies the extinction 
of ‘religion’.96 Such an approach, fails to recognise the pluralistic manner in 
which people explain their world in modern Western society.97 As such, a less 
traditional way of thinking about ‘secularisation’ is necessary to serve the 
current purpose. 
 
To adequately address the qualifier ‘secular’, this chapter will endeavour to 
achieve two intrinsically wedded objectives. Firstly, it will propose a model of 
‘secularisation’ that addresses the prevailing problems in the various 
incarnations of the ‘secularisation thesis’. This model will assert that 
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‘secularisation’, rather than representing a shift in the way in which individuals 
‘subjectively’ explain their world, represents a shift in the over-arching 
‘metanarrative’ of the societal collective. By this, it is meant that the over-arching 
metanarrative, under which all ‘subjective’ conceptual machineries are ordered, 
has shifted. Secondly, this chapter will provide a historical account of how the 
West arrived at the point where this process of narrative shifting has come 
about. As a result, the methodological grounds on which this dissertation’s 
endeavour has been based shall be made wholly explicit.  
 
Prior to commencing such an endeavour, the purpose of this particular chapter 
must be made explicit, in terms of the argument pursued in subsequent chapters. 
This chapter only intends to provide the bare methodological groundings for our 
model of ‘secularisation’. Thus, rather than detailing what the Western 
metanarrative has shifted to, this chapter will only focus on the metanarrative of 
the past. The reason for proceeding in such a way is that the modern 
metanarrative warrants its own extended treatment in order to adequately 
understand the current paradigms of reality. Therefore, this chapter will only 
deal with the methodological specifics and the pre-Reformation ordering 
narrative.  
The Shifting of the Metanarrative 
While a majority of social scientists from a range of disciplines agree that in the 
modern Western world, the nature and practice of religion has changed, 
‘secularisation’ is by no means an agreed upon concept.98 Depending on the 
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scholar and the discipline, this seemingly self-evident truth of modernity takes 
on vastly different meanings from the ‘orthodox consensus’, which championed 
the notion that as modernity proceeded religiosity would wane and eventually 
disappear, of its intellectual past.99 For contemporary scholars, it is now 
recognised that secularisation does not occur according to the extreme 
formulations of the past. In other words, it is now a general consensus that the 
sociological prophecy that traditional religion is destined for extinction is 
incorrect. Regardless of the fact that current theories are considerably more 
sophisticated and developed than their predecessors, they are all fundamentally 
incomplete. By this it is not meant that they are necessarily wrong; rather, it is 
meant that certain aspects are not made explicit enough, as is the case with 
Demerath’s ‘meaning’ paradigm.100 As such, a specific incarnation of 
secularisation, which addresses a range of shortfalls in the various models of 
secularisation, shall be employed here. As Demerath suggests of all theories of 
secularisation, their findings and formulation are dependent on the perspective 
which the theorist proposing it holds.101 The formulation to be proposed here is 
no different. It is informed primarily by the social constructivism of Berger and 
Luckmann, Demerath’s theory of ‘secularisation and sacralisation’, and the work 
of others such as Stark and Gregory.102 By synthesising these approaches, a 
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model of the phenomenon of ‘secularisation’, which addresses the shortcomings 
of previous definitions, will be articulated.  
 
A preliminary task to laying out the model proper is to first identify two specific 
pitfalls that are common to theories of ‘secularisation’, which this formulation 
specifically seeks to avoid. The first pitfall it must navigate is in regards to the 
definition of ‘religion’ to be employed. A model, such as that of the 
Enlightenment proponents of secularisation, which simply states that ‘religion’ 
will wane as modernity takes hold, ignores the potentially ‘religious’ nature of 
existence. 103 It assumes a black and white distinction between what is ‘religious’ 
and what is not. Such a formulation neglects the fact that in our ‘secular’ age, 
individuals still separate things off from the broader world, in a way that is akin 
to Durkheim’s dichotomy of the ‘sacred and the profane’.104 People still derive 
meaning and solace from systems of belief, or world-views. Just because these 
models, or ‘sacred things’, do not have a traditionally religious nature, does not 
mean that the place which individuals assign them in their ‘subjective’ 
interpretation of reality is not akin to the place that was once occupied by 
traditional religious systems. This blurring of the normative definitional 
paradigm becomes all too evident when we, in the religious studies field, attempt 
to grapple with the challenge of reaching a consensus regarding the definition of 
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‘religion’. 105 So, to utilise the term ‘religion’, even with qualifiers such as 
subjective or institutional, is doing a model of ‘secularisation’ a disservice. As 
such, any model, which seeks to go beyond simply saying that ‘religious 
institutions have less hold on society than they did before modernity’, must 
endeavour to provide a definition of religion along with the methodological 
formulation.  
 
The second pitfall, which must be navigated, is the ‘all or nothing’ formulation of 
secularisation. The ‘all or nothing’ formulation, which was prominent in 1960’s 
among scholars such as Berger and Wilson, posits that as a society we are 
moving from a wholly ‘religious’ way of deriving meaning towards a wholly 
‘secular’ method.106 In the first instance, critics accuse such formulations of 
fabricating a romanticised past where religiosity was once dominant. According 
to Mary Douglas, these idealised formulations are nothing but academic wishful 
thinking.107 Further, Rodney Stark proclaims that the religiosity of European 
Christendom was shallow at best, and that the Christian faith was never truly 
accepted and embraced by the masses.108 On the secularised side, such ‘all or 
nothing’ theories ignore the fundamentally pluralistic nature of modern life.109 
Rather than seeing ‘religion’ disappear, in the current stage of modernity, 
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traditional ‘religion’ has simply become one of the many ways which people 
explain their world.110 Furthermore, this pluralism of world-views means that 
people are able to have multiple world-views inform their picture of reality.  One 
such example can be found in the fact that  ‘religious’ means and ‘scientific’ 
means are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Evidence even suggests that, 
“societies with faith in science also often have stronger religious beliefs.”111 As 
such, a model of secularisation, which endeavours to account for these problems 
within previous formulations, must avoid the ‘all or nothing’ paradigm.  
 
The model of secularisation to be proposed here will actively address these 
problems and, thereby, avoid the pitfalls of our methodological forebears. For 
this model, ‘religion’ has a dual but specific meaning. The first meaning will 
pertain to the traditional Western religious institutions, namely the Catholic 
Church and the various Protestant centres of power. It is necessary to specifically 
speak of these institutions because secularisation is fundamentally a Western 
phenomenon, informed by events in European history.112 This assertion by no 
means intends to exclude other parts of the world, which are going through 
similar processes. Rather, this statement is a testament to the continuing extent 
of Western colonial domination, in this case specifically pertaining to cultural 
domination. The second meaning of ‘religion’ is the one that has been laid out in 
the previous chapter. This definition asserts that ‘religion’ is akin to ‘conceptual 
machinery’, which justifies the institutional order of reality. If this definition is 
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applied to the process of ‘secularisation’, then we can conclude that 
secularisation merely represents the replacing of one world-view, or ‘conceptual 
machinery’, for another.  
 
Such an assertion brings us to the mode in which the second pitfall listed above 
will be remedied. Evidently, in the formulation of secularisation that posits 
religion to be a conceptual machinery, we are still working in extremes as 
religiosity persistence is neglected. If we were to simply say that Western society 
utilised the Christian conceptual machinery and that they now utilise a scientific 
one, we are still foregoing the pluralistic nature of existence and the multiple 
competing conceptual machineries, which need attention.113 Regardless of the 
differing terminology, we are still guilty of assuming a pious past and 
proclaiming a purely scientific future.114 To adequately avoid such a formulation, 
the model proposed here will not assert that we are moving in a linear and 
inevitable fashion from piety to rationalism.115 It is extremely unlikely that in the 
inherently subjective experience, which characterises human existence, that 
there has ever been a society where one narrative uniformly explains reality for 
the totality of individuals within a collective. Such a system would need to be of 
the utmost simplicity regarding the differentiation of labour, as even the slightest 
deviation in experience would result in a differing perspective on the prevailing 
institutional order.116 As such, the model proposed here will take into account 
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the pluralistic nature of human existence as to avoid the pitfall of the ‘all or 
nothing’ formulations.  
 
 In order to adequately avoid the myth of a previously uniform past, this 
formulation of secularisation proposes that a complex society, similar to those 
which have characterised the last twelve hundred years of Western history, is 
bound together by an over arching metanarrative that has been objectified to a 
greater degree than the subjective world-views held within smaller blocks of 
society. If we take the model of institutional order, proposed in the previous 
chapter, then we recognise that systems of existence are legitimated by 
particular conceptual machineries. Combining such a model with the assertions 
of Stark and Douglas, that human existence has always been relatively pluralistic, 
we arrive at an interesting conclusion.117 It becomes evident that, while 
subjective conceptual machineries have always been important, there must be a 
broader over-arching ordering principle under which reality derives its objective 
status. There must be a socially accepted ‘fact’, which is able to transcend 
cultural boundaries, that is truly taken for granted and, therefore, acts to order 
every part of existence. If this were not the case then the large cooperative 
collectives of people, such as those that have characterised European history 
since the Holy Roman Empire, would not be possible.118 As such, it must be the 
case that, in complex societies, which include multiple distinct smaller cultural 
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groupings, subjective conceptual machineries must be ordered by an over-
arching metanarrative, which acts to order ‘reality’.  
 
If the above notion of the ‘metanarrative’ is accepted, then secularisation takes 
on a rather different form. In the tradition of Demerath’s ‘secularisation and 
sacralisation’ paradigm, we can assert that ‘secularisation’ is characterised by 
the loss of ‘religious’ meaning, in the Durkheimian sense of the phrase, of a 
previous over-arching paradigm and the sacralisation, or objectification, of a new 
one.119 This means that the ‘matter of fact’, which once structured the world that 
the various sections of society inhabit, no longer holds a privileged position in 
the ordering of reality. Following from this, if the community is to remain 
unified, a new ordering principle must come into being. In the current 
manifestation of ‘secularisation’, this means that where Christianity once 
provided the institutional and doctrinal framework for society to operate as a 
cohesive whole, it no longer acts as such. As should be evident when we take into 
account the vast plurality of conceptual machineries in modern Western society, 
this shift does not mean that everyone in the broader collective suddenly sheds 
his or her historically informed world-views. Rather, it only pertains to the 
broader ordering system. This shift, as has been the case in western society, 
manifests itself in institutional terms, which may then trickle down to the 
individual perspective. What this means for the previous over-arching paradigm 
is that it merely becomes another ‘subjective’ method for explaining reality. If we 
take the decline of Christianity as an example, we can observe that the 
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institutions that propagate the Christian over-arching paradigm have lost the 
ability to order societies actions directly, as is apparent in the fact that people 
work on Sunday and eat meat other than fish on Friday night. This decline in 
institutional influence has then allowed for ‘secular’ modes of socialisation to 
occur, such as government school systems. This shift then in turn causes a 
decline in individual religiosity. What results is that Christianity is reduced to the 
status of simply another ‘subjective’ means of explaining the world, albeit a 
historically important one.120 This model is therefore able to account for both the 
decline of traditional religious institutions, regarding their ability to influence 
society, and personal religiosity. As such, secularisation, utilising the model of 
metanarratives, represents the ‘subjectification’ of a previously ‘objective’ 
ordering paradigm and, if the over-arching collective is to remain such, the rise 
of a new ordering system. 
 
Inevitably, like all models, this formulation does not provide a ultimately ‘true’ 
account of the sociological process that it claims to describe. Nonetheless, it 
provides a model that adequately accounts for the discontinuities of 
‘secularisation theory’. Firstly, it specifically accounts for the definition of 
religion by employing Berger and Luckmann’s ‘constructivist’ model, which 
states that a ‘religion’ represents a conceptual machinery that acts to legitimise a 
given institutional order. Secondly, it addresses the ‘all or nothing’ problem by 
accounting for and specifically addressing the plurality of worldviews, which 
constitute human existence. Finally, it identifies the nature of secularisation as 
an institutional phenomenon that works closely with individual perspectives, as 
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metanarratives are institutional by nature and their changing constitutes an 
institutional shift that may be followed by individual shifts. As such, the 
‘metanarrative’ model of secularisation will sufficiently serve the purpose of 
informing the endeavour of this dissertation.  
The Unintended Secularisation of Reality 
For the model proposed above to adequately hold weight, it is necessary for the 
shifting of the previous ordering principle of Western Europe, which was 
characterised by Christian truth claims as propagated by the Catholic Church, to 
be properly accounted for. As such in this section, it shall be shown that the 
shifting of the metanarrative, away from Catholic Christianity, of western society 
was a product of the Reformation. This is the case, as the Reformation resulted in 
the continued questioning and undermining of ecclesiastical authority and, 
therefore, eventually the monarchical structures that it shared its divine 
authority with.121 Placing this event in terms of the constructivist methodology 
presented in the second chapter, the Reformation represented the point at which 
the previously objectified view of reality was no longer self-evident and, 
therefore, became problematic.122 By disputing the central claims of the 
metanarrative, the reformers across Europe brought the ordering system of 
Christendom into a realm where it was no longer able to provide an objective 
grounding for reality.123 This is what occurred during the Reformation and 
eventually led to the secularisation of Western society. 
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In order to adequately account for such a process, this section will be divided 
into three parts. Firstly, it will make explicit the role and the status of the 
institution that propagated the ordering narrative of Christendom, that being the 
Catholic Church. Following this, it will address how the Reformation specifically 
undermined the Church’s metanarrative by bringing the ecclesiastical authority 
into question. Finally, the actual shifting of the narrative shall be brought to light 
by analysing a specific aspect of life, which was previously ordered by Catholic 
truth claims. By viewing the shift in what constituted ‘knowledge’ following the 
Reformation, the thesis regarding secularisation shall be strengthened. As a 
result, it shall be demonstrated that the Reformation was the event that resulted 
in the shifting of the metanarrative of Western reality.  
 
During the medieval period, the Church was the over-arching institution that 
determined the metanarrative under which reality was to be articulated. 
Regardless of the fact that the Church was the direct inheritor of the legacy of 
Rome, this power was not a fundamental aspect of its being.124 The pagans of 
Europe did not simply convert, and instantly endow the Church with a 
transcendent power such as it had during the high medieval period.125 Rather, 
the Roman Church’s power to dictate the narrative of reality was derived from 
the wedding of the Western medieval political system and the Church’s 
transcendental truth claims.126 The result of such a union would inevitably be a 
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political system endowed with a divine legitimacy and a religious system that 
was supported and enforced by worldly power. This wedding of institutions 
acted as a mutually reinforcing relationship where Monarchs were Monarchs 
because it was God’s will and the Church was a powerful institution because it 
was the bearer of God’s truth. 127 The end result of such a relationship was a 
strongly propagated system of institutional legitimation where the Church’s 
truth claims were built into every facet of existence.  
 
The first example of such a union came about as a result of the coronation of 
Charlemagne, King of the Franks, as Holy Roman Emperor. Due to a combination 
of his winning favour with Pope Leo III and the Byzantium Empress Irene 
becoming embroiled in a dispute regarding the iconoclastic nature of Byzantine 
Christianity, Charlemagne was able to position himself as the inheritor of the 
Imperial title.128 While the King gained no wealth or land from his crowning as 
Emperor on Christmas day 800 AD, the “title was of more lasting significance 
than any number of conquests; for it meant that, after more than four hundred 
years, there was once again an emperor in Western Europe.”129 This united 
Christendom, now under one ruler, would bring large swathes of the continent 
under the heading of the Holy Roman Empire.130 In doing so, he was able to unite 
multiple communities and realities under the one heading and therefore under 
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the shared conceptual machinery, as propagated by the politico-religious union 
between his court and the Papal institution. 
 
This becomes obvious when what happened at the Christmas mass in Rome in 
800CE is investigated. If it was the case, as written by Charlemagne’s courtier 
and biographer, Einhard, that Pope Leo III crowned the ruler of Western Europe 
with a title that “he was far from wanting”, then theoretically the Pope had 
cemented the power given to the Papacy in the forged Donation of Constantine.131 
In giving Charlemagne the title of Emperor, he had given himself, and future 
Popes to come, the role of the endower of legitimate rulership. In other words, 
what the Pope really achieved was an implicit elevation over the Emperor of the 
West, which, in doing so, had asserted the Papacy’s superiority over the 
monarchical institutions that would characterise the high Middle Ages.132 
Regardless of whether this was the case, or that Charlemagne had in fact 
crowned himself, both the Church and the Frankish court gained equally due to 
the mutually beneficial relationship that divine authority gifted. The Papal 
institution had its worldly protector, the Holy Roman Empire had its divine 
legitimacy, and Western Europe had its institutionalised metanarrative. Due to 
the fundamental success of this endeavour, throughout the medieval period, 
monarchs sought the Church’s blessing in all of their endeavours and hoped to 
gain its recognition as legitimate Christian rulers in order to perpetuate the 
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model of institutional integration.133 Therefore, as a result of the successes of 
Charlemagne’s model, the Church, with assistance from the medieval political 
system, was able to become the entity that determined the metanarrative, under 
which individual world-views where ordered. 
 
The Reformation represents the period where this ability to dictate the 
fundamental metanarrative of existence was undermined. Prior to this, the 
Papacy and the ecclesiastical appendages were exclusively able to determine 
what constituted Christian truth-claims. For as Pope Innocent I stated, “any just 
pronouncement might be confirmed by all the authority of this See, and that the 
other Churches might from thence gather what they should teach.”134 This 
ability, due to the institutional wedding between the political and the religious 
systems, remained relatively consistent throughout the medieval period. The 
Church in Rome had retained its conceptual monopoly from Charlemagne’s 
coronation throughout the turbulent events of the high medieval period, 
specifically the Crusades and the major heresies, such as the Cathars and the 
Waldensians, up until Martin Luther nailed his ninety-five theses to a door of the 
Castle Church in Wittenberg and birthed a hermeneutic revolution.135 The reason 
why these theses, and the movement that followed, were able to radically disturb 
the Church’s conceptual monopoly is twofold. Firstly, there was a growing 
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recognition of the gap between the doctrine of Christianity and the practice of 
ecclesiastical officials, which, according to Luther, “as a result, the whole of 
Christendom has fallen abominably.” 136 So, rather than just being forgotten, 
these theses struck a chord with a wider range of people.137 As such, a consensus 
of acute discontent with the pervading institutional arrangement was brought 
about. Secondly, the invention of the printing press was fundamental in both 
initiating the cry for reform and facilitating the hermeneutics of the Reformation, 
which acted to maintain the discontent with the pervading order of things. 138 
Without the printing press, the distinct divide between the actions of 
ecclesiastical officials and the words of scripture would not have been as widely 
recognised as it came to be.139 Furthermore, without the press, Luther’s theses 
would have not reached as many people as they inevitably did.140 Evidently, 
what these, and a range of other nuanced factors, achieved was that they brought 
the metanarrative, as perpetuated by the Catholic Church in Rome, to a point 
where it was no longer self-evident.  
 
The fact that the Reformation movement became so widespread is evidence that 
the previously ‘objectivated’ ordering paradigm was no longer serving its 
purpose as the taken for granted underpinning of reality. Although, once this 
point was reached, the previous metanarrative was not simply replaced, as there 
                                                        
136 Gregory, The Unintended Reformation, 21; Martin Luther, “The Appeal to the 
German Nobility,” in Documents of the Christian Church, 208. 
137 Martin E. Marty, Martin Luther: A Life (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 34. 
138 Lee Palmer Wandel, The Reformation: Towards a New History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 63. 
139 Stephen J. Nichols, The Reformation: How a Monk and a Mallet Changed the 
World (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2007), 131. 
140 Marty, Martin Luther: A Life, 34. 
  48
was no ‘objective’ model to replace it. Beyond the united discontent with the 
Catholic Church, there was little agreement among the different parties seeking 
reformation about how this would actually be achieved. This becomes evident 
when the divide between the moderate reformers, such as Luther himself, is 
contrasted with some of its more radical components, such as Thomas Muntzer 
and the Anabaptists.141 For if it was the case that, as according to the principle of 
sola scriptura, scripture was the sole basis for determining Christian truth claims, 
then what interpretation of scripture was the correct one?142 This lack of a 
united ‘objective’ system was the reason why Protestant Christianity did not 
simply just replace the Roman interpretation as the over-arching metanarrative.  
The lack of a self-evident metanarrative, according to Berger and Luckmann, is 
all that is necessary to disrupt a conceptual machinery and, therefore, the 
broader institution, which it legitimates.143 Therefore, as a result of the 
disruption of the previous Catholic metanarrative and the lack of a unified new 
one, the Reformation represents the event that disrupted the over-arching 
metanarrative of Western Christendom.  
 
This shifting of the ordering principle of reality, away from the traditional one of 
Christendom, becomes apparent when we observe the point where Christian 
truth claims began to be segregated from the broader societally objectified 
experience. The most potent example of this comes in the form of the quest for a 
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system of knowledge that was not based on Christian doctrine.144 Prior to such a 
model being developed, all ‘knowledge’ of the natural world was filtered through 
Christian truth claims. This was the case as, prior to the first universities 
opening, ‘education’, as defined by the teaching of the classical categories of 
learning, took place primarily within the monasteries.145 Subsequently, due to 
the fact that Christian truth claims pervaded every facet of existence, 
universities, when they came about, were also fundamentally Christian in their 
mode of instruction and the students’ manner of living, which was essentially 
monastic.146 While the shared metanarrative was strong, new discoveries were 
easily rectified and normalised by the over-arching paradigm, as was the case 
with the integration of Aristotelian natural philosophy in the twelfth century.147 
Only when the ordering system itself became problematic, did the broader mode 
of ‘knowing’ need to be replaced. In other words, as the truth claims, which were 
fundamentally wedded to medieval modes of ‘knowledge’, were brought into the 
realm of ‘subjective opinion’, it was necessary for a system of knowing, which 
was not dependent on religious belief, to be developed. As such, this ‘sectioning 
off’ of Christian beliefs from ‘knowledge’ represents the beginning of the shifting 
of the metanarrative, under which reality is ordered.  
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Conclusion 
Through undertaking this brief, but wide ranging, discussion of the ‘secular’, and 
therefore what is meant by ‘secularisation’, a point has been arrived at where 
these concepts should be clear. The first section of this chapter endeavoured to 
methodologically outline a model of secularisation that addresses the pitfalls 
that many other theories have been unable to avoid. Through such an endeavour, 
it was proposed that ‘secularisation’ represents the shifting of the metanarrative 
of reality. Where Christianity once was the primary ordering principle, under 
which all other conceptual machineries were rectified, ‘secularisation’ has meant 
that this is no longer the case. As a result of this shift, the power of traditional 
religiosity has waned regarding its ability to dictate the manner in which reality, 
and therefore society, is to be ordered.  
 
Following this, the chapter has endeavoured to demonstrate how and when this 
shifting of the metanarrative came about. Following the rise of Charlemagne, the 
Church held an important role within the religio-political system of the medieval 
period. This union allowed the Roman Church to define the parameters of the 
ordering principle, which united all the culturally diverse groups of Europe 
under one over-arching worldview. Following the Reformation, this ability was 
disrupted due to the fact that the Latin Church’s truth claims were no longer 
taken to be self-evident. The principle of sola scriptura meant that the Church’s 
doctrinal parameters now had to compete with a range of differing 
interpretations regarding the lived Christian experience. As such, Christianity 
role as the ordering metanarrative was lost because its doctrine moved into the 
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realm of subjective belief. This becomes evident when observing Christian truth 
claims’ exclusion from ‘knowledge’ following the Reformation. 
 
Following the methodological endeavours of the first part of this dissertation, we 
have arrived at a place where we can adequately discern a few important 
concepts. According to Berger and Luckmann’s constructivist system of 
institutional order, a ‘religion’ represents a conceptual machinery that provides 
legitimation for a given institutional order.148 According to the interpretation 
provided by this chapter, individual conceptual machineries, when groups with 
differing world-views are integrated into a single ordering system, are ordered 
under a metanarrative. This metanarrative, for the European world, has 
traditionally been that of Christianity, as propagated by the Catholic Church. 149 
Following the Reformation, the ability to order the conceptual machineries of the 
diverse cultural groups, which constitute the broader European community, was 
disrupted. As such, any conceptual machinery, which was developed out of the 
metanarrative that emerged following the Reformation, can, in our definitional 
paradigm, be dubbed a ‘secular religion’.  
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Part Two: Modernity, ‘Secular Religion’, and Economics 
Chapter Four: The Mechanistic Metanarrative of Modernity 
Introduction 
Following the Reformation, Roman Catholic Christianity no longer had the ability 
to be the unifying element it once was. By bringing the metanarrative of Western 
Europe into a state of disrepute, the Reformers had assured that no longer could 
vast sways of Europe share the conceptual umbrella of old. Thus, Europe became 
once again a continent splintered by the Wars of Religion, where competing 
dogmatic truth claims demonstrated their true propensity for violence.150 If 
there was ever again to be a Europe wide consensus regarding the nature of 
reality, a new system of understanding the world needed to be developed. This 
chapter will specifically argue that this new system was a causally mechanistic 
world-view that was derived from the principle of ‘rationality’. Not only does this 
perspective of reality, such as Roman Christianity once did, lie at the heart of our 
political institutions, it also defines our day-to-day interaction and perspective 
with and of the world. For those who subscribe to this modern default-shared 
picture of reality, we are rational agents living amongst a sea of causal 
interactions that are governed by ultimate rules of nature. While it must be 
recognised that civility does break down between countries that prescribe to the 
same over-arching metanarrative, as was the case during the First and Second 
World Wars, in the same way that Catholicism provided a shared reality for the 
countries embroiled in conflict, these perspectives inform our modern conflict 
realities as much as they inform our perspective of a world at peace. 
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To adequately derive this metanarrative of modernity, a number of steps will 
need to be undertaken. Firstly, it is necessary to make explicit the problems that 
were brought about by the Reformation movement with regards to deriving a 
consensus regarding the ‘true’ nature of reality. Following from this, the rise of 
the causally mechanistic worldview will be accounted for through three distinct 
steps. The first stage involves the unification of mathematics with natural 
philosophy, through Galileo’s discoveries and formulations. The second stage 
was achieved by Descartes’ expansion of the role played by mathematics in 
deriving knowledge about the natural world. Out of such an application arose the 
mechanistic system, which we utilise today in order to understand reality. The 
final step for this metanarrative to be instituted came about through Spinoza’s 
application of a mechanistic worldview to elements of social interaction and 
systems of governance. By doing this, Spinoza influenced the development of a 
democratic political system, which would allow a mechanistic worldview to be 
instiutionalised. As a result, this system was able to become the over-arching 
metanarrative of modernity.  
‘Truth’ Interrupted  
The Reformation resulted in a radical discontinuity in Christianity’s ability to 
provide the objective grounding for reality. No longer was the Church in Rome 
broadly accepted as God’s house on Earth, and no longer were its assertions able 
to proceed unchallenged.151 On the other side of the recently formed theological 
divide, the reformers’ interpretations of Christian truth were just as fallible. The 
theological disputes born out of hermeneutics resulted in a splintered front 
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regarding the nature of ‘true’ Christianity.152 The ‘objective’ system of existence, 
which had survived since 800 CE, was now a matter of opinion and 
interpretation.  
 
This now apparently ‘subjective’ nature becomes apparent when the process by 
which the various Protestant truth claims were arrived at is explicitly analysed. 
As previously stated, the first principle for garnering Christian truth during the 
Reformation lay in the ‘infallible’ holy word of scripture. The embracing of such a 
principle resulted in the papal institution being stripped of its ability to provide 
the definitive interpretation of God’s word and, therefore, it was also stripped of 
the authority to determine what specifically constituted Christian truth claims. 
According to Luther, this ability was lost due to the fact that, “we are all 
priests…and have all one faith, one Gospel, one Sacrament; how then should we 
not have the power of discerning and judging what is right or wrong in matters 
of faith?”153 The only problem with such a principle, if there were not one final 
adjudicator on earth such as the Pope, is that there would inevitably be radically 
differing opinions on what was to be derived from scripture. As such, the unified 
cry from the reformers, which called for the creation of a system of Christianity 
that followed the word of God, was never to find a unified doctrine from the 
interpretation of scripture. A further point of dispute lay in the principle of sola 
scriptura itself. The Reformers could not agree on whether the ‘true’ Christian 
practice meant having a Church that strictly followed the Bible or a system that 
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retained certain inherited traditions.154 While magisterial reformers, such as 
Luther, Zwingli and Calvin, desired to retain traditional elements, such as the 
writings of the early Church Fathers, many desired to see them stripped from 
Christian practice and doctrine all together.155 Amongst the reformers, not only 
was the actual interpretation of the scriptures in dispute but also so was the 
question of whether Christian practice should be derived from scripture alone. 
Contrasting such a state with that of the period of ecclesiastical domination, it 
becomes apparent why such claims were relegated to the realm of ‘subjective 
belief’.  
 
The second principle, which was utilised to derive the true way in which 
Christianity was to be practiced, was that of divine inspiration. For many, truth 
claims regarding the nature of God went beyond the simple reading of scripture; 
they lay in direct communion with his word. According to Zwingli, one of the 
reformers who was most vocal about his communion with the divine, “[i]f we are 
to receive and to understand anything, it must be give from above.”156 Such 
sentiments were also echoed by many of his rival contemporaries.157 Reliance on 
individual inspiration from above was always going to be a point of contention, 
as there was no real way to prove that your inspiration was truly derived from 
God. As such, the claims to spiritual endowment were multiple and frequently in 
complete opposition to each other. One such example of dispute is that had 
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between Zwingli and Luther. Zwingli wrote that, “I know for certain that God 
teaches me, because I have experienced the fact of it.”158 Luther responded, 
“[b]eware of Zwingli and avoid his books as the hellish poison of Satan, for the 
man is completely perverted and has completely lost Christ.”159 If hermeneutic 
interpretation did not produce enough disagreement, claims to divine 
inspiration definitely did. As such, post-Reformation Christianity was marred by 
persistent and vibrant disagreement, which led to a range of vicious conflicts, 
such as the Thirty Years War.160 
 
In the face of such dispute and chaotic uncertainty, in order to adequately order 
and make sense of the world, it was necessary for a new ‘objective’ system of 
reality to be developed and implemented. For, as quickly became apparent in the 
wake of the wars of Reformation, Europe could not continue as a somewhat 
unified whole with such radical disagreements regarding the nature of reality.161 
As such, there was a need to dispose of the dogmatic adherences of the past, with 
the goal of creating new systems that did not produce differing knowledge 
depending on an individual’s particular religious affiliation.  
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The first major watershed for this process of creating a novel system of knowing 
arose with Galileo (1564-1642).162 Like many Renaissance mathematicians, 
Galileo sought to gain an equal place for his science alongside the Church 
ordained Aristotelian natural philosophy, which, like the Church, had a 
conceptual monopoly regarding knowledge of reality. More specifically, Galileo 
sought to reform natural philosophy as to include mathematics within the 
methods of deriving knowledge of and from the world.163 The traditional view of 
mathematics, as held by most natural philosophers, was that it was a lesser 
science. Rather than describing and attaining the true ‘form’, in the Aristotelian 
sense of the word, of things, it only dealt with quantities and measurements. The 
mathematical model was therefore not thought of as overly important in the 
process of deducing the principles of reality.164 
 
As such, the importance of Galileo’s History and Demonstrations Concerning 
Sunspots (1613) is twofold.165 Firstly, within it, he successfully championed the 
empirical observation of events, or objects, in order to attain knowledge 
regarding the ‘form’ of the subject in question. Secondly, and in the process of 
achieving the first, he successfully undermined Aristotelian natural philosophy, 
which the Church has become so firmly wedded to. These points were reached 
through his being the victor in a dispute regarding the nature of sunspots, which 
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he was embroiled in with the Jesuit mathematician, Christopher Scheiner. 
According to Aristotelian natural philosophy, the celestial realm was perfect and 
eternally unchanging in its form of motion, that being it’s orbiting in perfect 
circles.166 Scheiner had thought the observed sunspots to be objects orbiting the 
sun that were to small to be, in the Aristotelian sense, ‘properly ordered’.167 
Galileo on the other hand concluded that these sunspots were manifestations on 
the sun’s surface itself. Using empirical measurement, Galileo drew the 
conclusion that when the sunspots appeared near the edges of the sun, there was 
an apparent shrinkage regarding their diameter.168 What resulted was that 
Galileo proved that it was possible to derive conclusions regarding the nature of 
manifestations through empirical measurement and mathematical calculation, 
and by doing such he successfully undermined Aristotelian natural philosophy. 
Such achievements were instrumental in laying the ground for the mechanistic 
model, which would take the place of scripturally informed Aristotelian natural 
philosophy.169 
The Metanarrative of Modernity 
The model that rose in the wake of Galileo’s work, and the Reformation that had 
caused the ‘truth’ of old to no longer be self-evident, provided a new way of 
understanding the world that was divorced from the over-arching institutions of 
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religion.170 This was a ‘rationally’ derived system of mechanistic causal 
interactions, as articulated by the endeavours of a range of thinkers, including 
Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz.171 By ‘rational’, we are invoking the traditional 
meaning as championed by Descartes. He specifically proposed that ‘rationality’ 
was the process by which humanity utilised their mental capabilities to derive 
the underlying assumed tenets on which systems are constructed. According to 
Descartes, through such an endeavour, humanity would strip away the false 
truth on which our conceptions of reality are built.172 Such an exercise was 
distinctly contrasted with knowledge of the world that was informed by 
traditional religious sources.173 In order to make sense of the world, such a mode 
of deriving knowledge gave birth to a ‘causal’ and ‘mechanistic’ perspective of 
reality, as epitomised by Newton’s laws.174 This view of reality, in the face of the 
metaphysical disorder provided by the post-Reformation intellectual landscape, 
proposed that the world is governed by infallible laws that dictate the manner in 
which reality unfolds. Such a view of reality was extended to the totality of 
human existence due to Spinoza’s ethical and political developments, which were 
underpinned by his one substance doctrine.175 This conceptual leap allowed 
rationality to inform the rights based model, which underpins the modern 
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operation of the state. As such, due to the institutional wedding between this 
model and the state, the system rose to the status of metanarrative following the 
European political revolutions of the eighteenth century.  
 
Following Galileo, the next thinker to contribute to this rise of the metanarrative 
of ‘rationality’ was Descartes.176 As Descartes served as a soldier in the Thirty 
Years War, he witnessed the problems that conflicting dogmatic truth claims 
could produce first-hand.177 In light of his experiences, Descartes sought to build 
a system of knowledge that provided absolute truth in the way that 
hermeneutics evidently could not.178 In order to achieve such a system, 
Descartes asserted that “everything should be completely overturned” and that 
knowledge “should begin again from the most basic foundations.”179 As such, 
Descartes rejected the traditional premises of Aristotelian natural philosophy. 
Rather than relying on the traditional interpretations of others, he proposed that 
the world should be known through sola ration, or by reason alone. 180 
 
 Through his meditations, Descartes came to develop a system of understanding 
the natural world that was wholly novel when compared to that of traditional 
Aristotelian scholars.181 Through the guise of Descartes’ dualism, which 
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proposed that the world of thought and the physical world were comprised of 
wholly different substances, he proposed that matter was essentially dead 
weight that was driven by mechanistic interactions.182 For if all properties that 
were not mathematical in nature, such as colour, taste, smell and so on, were 
part of the world of thought and not the physical one, then all interactions in the 
world could be described through purely physical descriptions.183 In other 
words, since characteristics of objects were not part of the physical world, then 
only mathematical elements of matter need be dealt with when describing 
natural processes. As such, Descartes championed a view of the world that 
reduced natural phenomena to the interaction of differing quantities of blocks of 
matter, which behaved in line with specific mathematically derivable laws. 
 
This orderly system of causal interactions, which were governed by divinely 
ordained rules of nature, proved incredibly popular and influential among the 
Enlightenment thinkers.184 The system’s appeal, rather than lying in the 
inalienable truth that Descartes sought, lay in the benefits that could be reaped 
from its application.185 For if elements of ‘subjective’ human experience were 
stripped from the calculation of reality, the world appeared orderly and easily 
calculable. One only need look around at the mechanical marvels that humanity 
has reaped since Descartes’ meditations to be sure of such a statement.  
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Due to the fundamental success of Descartes’ system, such mechanistic 
perspectives began to be applied to realms other than that of natural 
phenomena. What resulted was a system that applied mechanistic principles to 
social interactions. Such a development was facilitated primarily thanks to 
Spinoza’s monism. While Spinoza was greatly indebted to Descartes, in terms of 
a mathematized perspective on reality, the philosophical tenets of his system 
differ greatly.186 As a result, Spinoza’s philosophical system lies at the heart of 
our current political worldview in a way that Descartes’ does not, as Descartes’ 
system is primarily concerned with the material objects of reality.  
 
Where Spinoza and Descartes fundamentally differ is in regards to their 
perspective of the nature of matter and thought in the physical world. While 
Descartes believed that thought and matter were two wholly different 
substances, hence the phrase “I think, therefore I am”, Spinoza famously derived 
that everything shared a fundamental nature.187 In his posthumously published 
magnum opus, Ethics (1677), he asserted that mind and body, God and nature 
were all of the same fundamental essence because “besides God, no substance 
can be…conceived.”188 In light of such a belief, Spinoza contends that, since all 
parts of reality are fundamentally intertwined, then all aspects of nature are 
governed by one set of rules.189 Such a belief, while still obviously mechanistic, is 
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at complete odds with the dualism of Descartes.190 For in the world of Descartes, 
God still functioned as a definitive Being who possessed divine providence and 
will. As such, within Descartes’ system, religious institutions and scripture were 
still very much a source of authority. Spinoza’s system, with its doctrine of 
monism, prescribed that since God was ultimately part of all substances, then 
any claims to superiority based on divine providence were totally invalid.191 
Such a claim, if taken to heart, has the ability to completely undermine the 
existing ecclesiastical and political order. In light of this, Spinoza decisively 
contributed to the construction of a political philosophy that was both 
mechanistic in its perspective and, due to such a perspective, espoused equality 
in its doctrine.192 
 
Through making such a conceptual leap, and applying causality to a democratic 
political system, Spinoza laid the ground for rationality to be politically 
institutionalised, and therefore become the metanarrative of modernity.193 While 
the political liberalism of Locke and Hobbes was also influential in facilitating the 
political revolutions of the eighteenth century, Spinoza’s doctrine of inalienable 
equality and ‘rights’ proved a decisive influence on the evolution of the current 
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incarnations of democracy.194 Such an influence is made explicit by historian 
Jonathan Israel. As a scholar who writes prolifically on the Enlightenment, he 
contends that there were two very specific streams of thought throughout the 
period. In his view, there were those who subscribed to the moderate 
Enlightenment, which was characterised by a dualistic perspective akin to 
Descartes’, and a radical stream, who subscribed to Spinoza’s monism.195 Those 
who were part of the moderate stream, such as Hobbes and Voltaire, due to their 
belief in the difference between the spiritual and the physical, were supportive of 
the existing status quo as, if they were explicitly aligned with the Church, it was 
divinely ordained or, if they believed the masses to have less rational ability than 
the nobility, it kept them in line.196 In distinct contrast, those who subscribed to 
Spinoza’s monism were devoutly democratic because, since everything in nature 
shared a fundamental essence, no man should be elevated above the other.197 
The perspective is summarised by Spinoza’s declaration, within his Theological-
Political Treatise (1670) that “[h]uman society can thus be formed of natural 
right...”, in the sense that it does not hinder the individuals’ natural right “to do 
all it has the power to do.”198 He concluded that such a right is solely preserved 
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within “such a society…called democracy.”199 Spinoza’s utilisation of the 
conception of ‘rights’ is furthered by a contrast between his system and that of 
Hobbes. According to Spinoza: 
I always preserve the natural rights in its entirety, and hold that the 
sovereign power in a state has a right over a subject only in proportion to 
the excess of its power over that subject; that is always the case in the 
state of nature.200 
Evidently Spinoza, and therefore those who prescribed to the radical 
Enlightenment, held a view of society that was mechanistically democratic due to 
inherent natural laws, in the form of the ‘rights’ of the individual. Due to the 
success and influence that such a system had, as is evident in the tenets of the 
American and French Revolution, it is safe to contend that modern democracy is 
an inherently mechanistic system that views individuals as equal agents with 
inalienable rights.201 Due to the fact that the modern Western political system is 
informed by such a view of reality, the metanarrative of rationality was able to 
be instiutionalised. 
Conclusion 
As previously mentioned, the reason why Christianity became the dominant 
metanarrative of the medieval period was that it became firmly wedded with the 
political sphere. Such an imbrication allowed that particular conceptual 
machinery to order and inform the totality of differing lived experiences within 
European Christendom. The institutionalisation of a democratically aligned 
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‘rights’ based model achieves the same ends. Rather than the rules of our 
existence being divinely ordained, they are now informed by laws that are 
apparently inherent in the nature of humanity. Such a system paints an ordered 
picture of reality that is akin to the one of a divinely instituted order. Where it 
was once asserted that God wills things to be so, it is now believed to be 
Newton’s laws governing the universe. Where we once believed that social 
hierarchies are the way they are due to the divine will, we now, in theory, 
concede that they follow from the innate equality of humanity. In other words, in 
the face of the disruption of reality, that the Reformation gifted, a mechanistic 
system was devised in order to paint a coherent picture of reality that did not 
depend on your particular religious affiliation. Spinoza’s endeavours allowed 
such a system to be utilised in the description of not only material interaction, 
but also that of human society. Such a development thereby allowed the system 
to be instiutionalised, and thus to become wholly self-evident.  Subsequently, it 
can be concluded that the metanarrative of modernity consist of a mechanistic 
system of rules and laws.  
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Chapter Five: The Invisible Hand – The ‘Secular Religion’ of Economics 
Introduction 
In the current Presidential election in the United States, ‘jobs’ and the ‘economy’ 
are the two catchcries; in the Eurozone, economists are crunching the numbers 
to reach pragmatic solutions overs the current debt crisis; and in Australia, 
cancer-like economic growth needs to be assured for the Labour government to 
be re-elected. In the same way that the ecclesiastical officials advised rulers of 
how they should run their kingdom, so now do economists. They dictate what 
social spending can be afforded, they advise on what strategic resources are 
necessary for growth, and the devise strategies regarding the goal of gaining full 
employment for the country. In short, economics determines how the state, and 
therefore the shared reality, is run. What should be immediately evident is that 
economics is a theoretical abstraction that underpins our modern existence. In 
light of our previous methodological undertaking, a legitimating system of this 
order is evidently able to attain the status of a conceptual machinery and, 
therefore, a religion. Furthermore, in light of the specific classification of what 
‘secular’ means, this system can be called a ‘secular religion’. This chapter 
intends to place such a statement beyond a doubt. 
 
To adequately achieve this task it is necessary to undertake a number of steps. 
Firstly, it is important to define economics explicitly, and to provide a brief 
history of economic thought. Following this, the system of thought dubbed 
‘classical economics’, as primarily developed by Adam Smith, will be specifically 
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shown to be a secular religion.202 Finally, the neo-liberal economic paradigm, as 
it is the current dominant paradigm of economic thought, shall be shown to be a 
secular religion.203 Through an analysis of these two systems, it will therefore be 
shown that economics adheres to this dissertation’s definition of a secular 
religion.  
The Rise of Economics 
According to the definitive textbook on economics of the early 20th century: 
Political Economy and Economics is a study of mankind in the ordinary 
business of life; it examines that part of individual and social action which 
is most closely connected with the attainment and with the use of the 
material requisites of wellbeing.204 
Evidently, economics has not and cannot serve such a purpose for the totality of 
human existence. Rather, such a statement is specific to a particular time and 
place where economics’ prized institution, the market, is an everyday feature of 
reality.205 As such, economics specifically owes its formulation to the creation of 
a ‘market’, in the modern sense, in the form of mercantilist trade. This section 
will seek to provide a brief historical overview of the rise of this discipline and its 
appendage, the market.  
 
                                                        
202 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money 
(London: Harvest Books, 1964), 3. 
203 Dani Rodrik, The Globalisation Paradigm: Democracy and the Future of the 
World Economy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2011), 164-167. 
204 Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (New York: Cosimo Inc., 2006 
[1890]), 1. 
205 John Kenneth Galbraith, A History of Economics: The Past as the Present 
(London: Penguin Books, 1987), 25. 
  69
 Prior to delving into the rise of this discipline, it is essential that the specific 
nature of economics is made explicit. According to John Kenneth Galbraith, the 
discipline of economics is one that concerns itself specifically with a number of 
specific issues. The first of these issues are the Theory of Value and the matters 
of distribution.206 The Theory of Value specifically contends with the question of 
devising what determines the price paid for goods and services rendered.207 In 
contrast, distribution contends with the way in which the gains from these goods 
and services are distributed. 208As the discipline has evolved, it has come to deal 
with the broader issues that derive from value and distribution. These include 
the questions of equitability of distribution, as taken on by Karl Marx, questions 
of overall economic performance of a country, questions of employment, such as 
how to attain full employment, and investigation of the money supply and 
inflation.209 As is befitting the metanarrative of modernity, economics contends 
with these issues in a mechanistic fashion, which applies rules of operation to 
these social phenomena as if they were purely physical, and therefore 
describable by universal laws.210 As such, what is meant by economics is the 
branch of enquiry that develops rules and theories to account for questions of 
the value of goods, distribution of wealth, and the issues that are intimately 
intertwined with these primary ones.  
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Prior to Adam Smith’s systematic analysis of the Theory of Value and the 
distribution of wealth, there had been no such enquiry as there had not been the 
historical conditions present to warrant one. Prior to the rise of mercantilist 
trade at the end of the fourteenth century, there had simply not been a 
widespread self-assigning institution of price-determination as most trade was 
conducted on an individual-to-individual basis.211 According to Galbraith: 
the market, though growing in importance with the passing centuries, 
was a minor aspect of life. The great rural masses of men and women 
grew, made of killed what they ate or wore and surrendered a part of it to 
a hierarchy of lords or masters for their right to do so...212 
Not to completely detract from the notion that there was a medieval incarnation 
of the market, but it is just the case that it was not a factor in everyday existence 
and, thus, was not something theoretically dwelled upon. 
 
The first real period where markets, as we know them today, were a major factor 
in existence came about during the era of mercantilism.213 Due to the bitter 
conflicts resulting from the Reformation, feudal blocks, instead of being united 
under the sway of Rome, coalesced into pseudo-national fronts that prescribed 
their loyalties to particular over-arching lords or monarchs.214 This new 
organisational structure, coupled with the advancements of sea exploration, as 
typified by Columbus’ discovery of the New World in 1492 and Vasco da Gama’s 
trip along the Cape of Good Hope in 1497-1498, caused international trade to 
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essentially double during the period 1500-1800.215 The system that specifically 
facilitated this marked increase in trade would come to be referred to as 
mercantilism.  The fundamental aim of such a system was to overcome what 
modern economist would call ‘transaction costs’. A ‘transaction cost’ is 
essentially any cost incurred in the process of propagating specific economic 
activity, in this case international trade.216 In light of this concept, Dani Rodrik 
contends that, “the bargain that a sovereign struck with private companies under 
mercantilism was essentially this: You, the company, pay for the institutional 
infrastructure, and in return I will allow you to make monopoly profits from the 
resulting trade.217 As such, the mercantilist system was characterised by state-
ordained trading companies who were granted specific rights over areas, and 
monopolies over certain products.218 These state-ordained facilitators of trade 
inturn set the rules, and therefore the foundations, for what later be called ‘the 
market’ to propagate. 
 
The intellectual bridge between the mercantilism of the early colonial period, 
and the era of economics proper, was brought about by the cementing of the 
notions of a mechanistic reality, which operates according to specific laws, 
within analysis of wealth and trade. Such a task was initially achieved by the 
group of French thinkers, who would later come to be known as the 
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Physiocrats.219 According to Charles Gide, the Physiocrats were “the first to 
realise that all social facts are linked together in the bonds of inevitable laws, 
which individuals and Governments would obey if they were once made known 
to them.”220 In direct contrast with the policies of mercantilism, the Physiocrats 
were primarily concerned with the finances of the state and the maintenance of 
independent agricultural.221 Such a stance came about due to their belief and 
reliance on the conception of the interrelated nature between social interaction 
and natural mechanistic laws. It was posited that, since nature is naturally 
multiplying, the only way to derive an economic surplus was through well-
controlled agriculture, which inturn supported the natural social hierarchy.222 As 
such, the key concept that the Physiocrats developed is the idea that a theoretical 
system can describe and support the ‘natural’ mode of operation. They extended 
the notions of infallible laws to social manifestations, and, in doing such, laid the 
grounds for the all-encompassing system of economics to be developed.223  
 
The first, and most influential, theoretical formulation of economics proper 
comes in the form of Adam Smith’s articulation of market principles in his 
canonical text, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
(1776). Smith’s theoretical endeavours were influenced by two particular 
developments. Firstly, in the wake of the scientific revolution and the rise of a 
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world ordered by natural laws, Smith’s system sought to extend such order to 
the world of commerce.224 Secondly, in the late eighteenth century, the Industrial 
Revolution was beginning to stir. In light of these developments, Smith sought to 
articulate a system of commerce that would suit the conditions created by the 
division of labour in the factory setting, which is famously demonstrated through 
Smith’s analysis of the pin factory.225 As the remaining classical period merely 
represents the further articulation and explication of Smith’s principles, 
regarding our endeavour, there is no need to currently proceed further. 
Evidently, what eventuated out of Smith’s grounding was a theoretical system 
that still orders, and describes, commerce in the twenty-first century.      
 
In light of such a brief overview, some fundamental points must be stressed. 
Smith’s system represents a theoretical formulation specific to its time. Prior to 
the advent of mechanised production and the division of labour, the market, as 
we know it today, did not exist. This is the case because there was nowhere near 
the number of goods to be distributed, and, thus, there was no need for multiple 
channels of sale or fundamental division of labour.226 In the wake of the 
developments provided by the mechanistic worldview, cheap manufactured 
goods became a fundamental part of existence, as made explicit by Smith’s 
analysis of the goods that sustain the average worker.227 These developments 
combined with the providential perspective regarding the development of 
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humanity, which is characteristic of Smith’s thought, brought about this 
articulation of ‘market principles’, which in turn snowballed to create the 
‘market’ itself.228 Keeping the endeavour of the first chapter in mind, rather than 
Economic doctrine being an all-encompassing transcendental truth, it must be 
recognised that Smith’s system is a particular ‘truth’ for a particular period.  
An Inquiry into the Smithian Paradigm: The Religious Nature of Classical Economics 
In light of such insight, this section will classify the system known as ‘classical 
economics’, as primarily developed by Adam Smith, as being a secular religion. 
Having spent the first half of this work dealing with the concepts of ‘secular’ and 
‘religion’, the path has been adequately laid for such a task to be undertaken. 
Nonetheless, prior to continuing, it is necessary for us to briefly recount the 
definitional paradigm within which this task lies. Concerning the term ‘secular’, 
according to Chapter Three, what is meant is a conceptual machinery, or world-
view, that has spawned out of the metanarrative of modernity. Regarding the 
contentious term ‘religion’, according to our constructivist methodology, it is a 
conceptual machinery that acts as a legitimating force for a particular symbolic-
universe. In other words, a religion is a particular theoretical system that acts to 
legitimate, or propagate, a particular order to the world. Specifically, according 
to Berger, “[r]eligion legitimates so effectively because it relates the precarious 
reality constructions of empirical societies with ultimate reality.” 229  
 
As such, this section will argue that classical economics represents a theoretical 
formulation that has spawned from the metanarrative of modernity, and 
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legitimates a particular socially ordained order to the world, which is related to 
an ultimate reality. In order to demonstrate this, each of the above 
characteristics will need to be addressed. Firstly, the ‘secular’ aspect will be 
addressed, by demonstrating that classical economics operates according to the 
premise that commerce can be deciphered and predicted through the use of 
infallible laws. Secondly, in order to demonstrate the systems’ legitimation of a 
particular order of the world, the mechanism of the market, known as the 
‘invisible hand’, will be addressed in light of its all-encompassing nature and the 
fact that it promotes an apparently ‘ultimate-reality’. At the conclusion of such an 
analysis, classical economics shall be conclusively identified as being a ‘secular 
religion’. 
 
 
The secular nature of Smith’s system should be truly self-evident. Nonetheless, it 
is important to emphasis its specific relation to the metanarrative of modernity, 
and therefore with our particular definition of ‘secular’. As is made abundantly 
clear in his essay, “The History of Astronomy” (1795), Smith was a dedicated 
proponent of the casually mechanistic worldview as developed by Descartes and 
Newton.230 As such, this perspective of reality underpins his moral and economic 
philosophy. Specifically within Smith’s economic formulations, there is the belief 
in a ‘natural’ mode of operation for human existence. Rather than ‘natural’ 
simply meaning unencumbered, Smith utilises the word in a way that is typical of 
Descartes’ and Newton’s ‘laws of nature’. Following in the tradition of seeking to 
apply a scientific approach to social interactions, as most famously undertaken 
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by his fellow Scotsman David Hume in his A Treatise on Human Nature (1739-
40), Smith characterised commerce as being governed by laws, which, if left 
unencumbered, would bring about certain outcomes.231 The most evident 
displays of these kinds of laws come in the form of Smith’s concept of human 
nature, in regards to commerce. Smith states that: 
The division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not 
originally the effect of any human wisdom… It is the necessary, through 
very slow and gradual consequence of a certain propensity in human 
nature… the propensity to truck, barter and exchange.232 
Smith’s broader system of market equilibrium is built on the foundation 
provided by this apparently ‘natural law’ of human nature. In the same way that 
the principles of gravity, when applied to the human body, still dictate its 
fundamental mode of operation, so too does the apparent propensity to barter 
influence the overall market system. The modern notions of demand being met 
by supply, and the natural equilibrium this brings, are tied in with the natural 
law to barter. As such, Smith presents a system that is mechanistic in the sense 
that it is governed by natural laws of human nature, which are in turn applied to 
the broader system. Therefore, it can be said that Smith’s theoretical formulation 
corresponds to the particular definition of ‘secular’ as presented in Chapter Four. 
 
Adam Smith’s mechanistic model of commerce is not simply a theoretical 
abstraction; rather, it is an all-encompassing system that proclaims to describe, 
decipher, and thereby legitimate a higher ‘truth’ and understanding of reality. 
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Smith’s system was not intended in the secular nature with which it has become 
linked. Rather, in keeping with Smith’s Newtonian perspective on God, his 
system is intertwined with a divine notion of providence.233 This relation should 
become evident when Smith’s famed ‘invisible hand’ is properly dwelled upon. 
This concept is only explicitly mentioned by name three times within the 
writings of Smith; nonetheless, these times are all in support of a naturally 
guided ethical state.234 As stated previously, Smith’s system is underpinned by 
what he believes to be a fundamental aspect of human nature, that being the 
propensity to barter. Built into this natural tendency is the desire to serve one’s 
own interests. According to Smith, for an individual seeking the staples of life:  
[I]t is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will 
more likely prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and show 
them that it is for their advantage to do for him what he requires of 
them.235 
He continues that, “[i]t is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or 
the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own 
interest.”236 Taking this thought to the broader macro scale, Smith concludes that 
wealth and goods are most cost-effectively distributed when these natural 
propensities are left to their own devices. For Smith, through the “study of his 
own advantage”, a worker seeks to be employed in the service that is greatest to 
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the broader society.237 In regards to producers, Smith proposes that since the 
manufacturers and merchants have a natural propensity to sell at home, they 
will sell what there is adequate demand for at home, and what is not desired will 
be sold elsewhere, where there is adequate demand.238 As such, Smith concludes 
that: 
By preferring the support of the domestic to that of foreign industry, he 
intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a 
manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his 
own gain, and he is in this, as may other cases, led by an invisible hand to 
promote an end which was no part of his intention.239 
These propensities of the market, combined with the natural price adjustments 
present in an unencumbered economy, will lead to the greatest shared 
prosperity due to the cheaper prices of goods, adequate employment, and 
adequate profits.240 As such, Smith’s system proposes that commerce produces 
the greatest moral outcome when the ‘natural’ order is left to its own devices. 
 
What should be apparent, is that within Smith’s conception of the natural order 
is a system that proclaims and legitimates a certain action, or way of living, as 
being ordained by some sort of ultimate reality. Such a view becomes clear when 
the above sentiments are placed within the context of Smith’s moral philosophy, 
as outlined in Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). Two passages are of critical 
importance. The first states that:  
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In every part of the universe we observe means adjusted with the nicest 
artifice to the ends which they are intended to produce, and admire how 
everything is contrived for advancing the two great purposes of nature, 
the support of the individual and the propagate of the species.241 
The second passage of importance is more directly related to commerce and 
economic order. Regarding the consumption of goods by the rich:  
They consume little more than the poor, and in spite their natural 
selfishness and rapacity…they divide with the poor the produce of all 
their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the 
same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, 
had the earth been divided into equal proportions among all its 
inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance 
the interest of society.242 
Evidently, due to his belief in a Newtonian providence, Smith is assured that the 
actions within the world are directed by a divine force to produce the best 
possible outcome. Such sentiments are obviously apparent within the first 
quotation. The second quotation extends such a belief to commerce, and, in doing 
such, proselytizes the belief that in acting in our own self-interest, the world will 
naturally produce a divinely endowed equilibrium. In regards to a constructivist 
definition of religion, Smith’s system of commerce utilises an apparent definition 
of an ultimate reality to legitimise the inequality of wealth around him. Due to a 
providential belief, he evidently believes that humanity acting in its own self-
interest will improve the shared lived experience of everyone. In light of such an 
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assertion, it should be evident that Smith’s system is religious in nature as “it 
relates the precarious reality constructions of empirical societies with ultimate 
reality.” 243 As such, Smith’s system, according to our definitional paradigm, is 
religious in nature.  
 
While it is not possible to delve into Smith’s underlying thought patterns, it is 
possible to analyse his circumstances. Smith was raised by his Calvinist Mother, 
he signed the Calvinist Westminster confession when he took the chair in Moral 
Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, and he was deeply influenced by the 
thought of Newton.244 Invoking Weber’s interpretation of Calvinism and the fact 
that God’s favour is demonstrated through worldly achievements, it can be 
discerned that Smith’s philosophical system was developed in light of such 
beliefs of Calvinistic providence.245 These beliefs were inturn complemented and 
systematised, or ‘secularised’, by his affinity with the Newtonian systems. What 
such a perspective produced was not only a notion of universal order, but also a 
system that legitimised the harsh realities of life in the late eighteenth century. 
Smith was able to observe the suffering around him and be assured that, within 
this apparently inequitable world, over-arching forces were at work to right the 
wrongs. In short, Smith developed a system that was a legitimation of the highest 
order. Not only did it legitimise self-interest, but it also legitimised the whole 
inequitable system of commerce that was propagated by the colonial 
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enterprise.246 He created a religious system, albeit a secular one, that described 
and justified an apparently ‘ultimate reality’ within the exploitation of the early 
industrial economic order. As such, there is no doubt that, within our definitional 
paradigm, the classical economics of Adam Smith is representative of a ‘secular’ 
religious system.   
Capitalism and Freedom: The Religious Nature of Modern Economics 
In Britain, the ideological parameters of Smith’s system became firmly 
institutionalised, in the form of a neoclassical economic system, following the 
overturning of the tariff on the importation of grains in 1846.247 Such a 
development, through ideological pressure, eventually resulted in the broad 
liberalisation of continental economies during the 1860s. During this period, the 
logical and concise arguments for a Smithian model legitimised unregulated 
international trade, domestic commerce, and, following the institution of the gold 
standard, flow of gold in and out of countries.248As Rodrik makes explicit, this 
regime of international liberalisation was eventually untenable due to its impact 
on domestic producers and the distribution of wealth. As such, it came to an end 
on the continent in the late 1870s, but was maintained in non-European 
countries through imperial force.249  
 
Nonetheless, one fundamental aspect of the European economic system 
remained liberalised, that being the financial system in the form of the Gold 
Standard. What this meant was that capital could flow freely from one country to 
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another as every European country allowed for their currency to be converted, 
by a set ratio, into gold.250 This system, much like Smith’s liberalisation of trade, 
was believed to naturally correct trade imbalances due to a decrease in the 
amount of currency in circulation.251 The ultimate collapse in the liberalised 
monetary system came about during the 1930s in the form of the Great 
Depression. As a result, the Smithian classical liberalism, which was no longer a 
self-evident description of the way the world worked, was replaced by the mixed 
economy as proposed by John Maynard Keynes.252 
 
The Keynesian epoch of government intervention, in order to dampen economic 
downturns, met the same fate as its neoclassical liberal forebear. The 1970s, due 
to a range of factors, was a decade characterised by economic stagnation, high 
inflation, and high rates of unemployment in developed countries.253 The 
Keynesian system of well-regulated markets was no longer self-evident, and, as 
such, there was a need for a new paradigm.254 The system that rose to take the 
position of old hegemonic economic discourse was that of neoliberalism. 
Accordingly, this is the paradigm that will be dealt with in this section.  
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The fundamental tenets of the neoliberal system are remarkably similar to that 
of Smith’s liberal paradigm. In the same way that Smith believed markets to be 
self-regulating entities that were guided by a state of moral equilibrium, so too 
do the main figures of the neoliberal paradigm, such as Milton Friedman and 
Friedrich von Hayek.255 Regardless of such similarities, these are two different 
systems that have arisen out of different circumstances and different streams of 
thought. Where Smith’s system is influenced by the concept of divine providence 
and the notion of a mechanistic like moral equilibrium, the neoliberal model is 
somewhat different regarding its underlying premises, primarily due to the Cold 
War context in which it arose. The elements of mechanistic like moral 
equilibrium remain, but the concept of providence is replaced by the catchcry for 
‘freedom’.256 Bound up within such a simplistic rallying point is the fundamental 
belief that with economic freedom comes an existence free of coercive forces.257 
As such, the neoliberal system prescribes a similar role for markets as a Smithian 
system, albeit for subtly different reasons.  
 
In light of the above introduction, this section will primarily concern itself with 
the task of designating modern neoliberal economic doctrine as being religious 
in nature. Following on from the previous section, there is no need to designate it 
as being ‘secular’ in nature as it is directly influenced by Smith’s system, and is 
therefore evidently ‘secular’. As such, this section will specifically concern itself 
with the ‘religious’ nature of this dogma. In order to achieve this, it is necessary 
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to identify neoliberalism as a system that legitimates a particular course of 
action for individuals and other actors, that being un-bridled self-interest, 
through the relation to an ultimate reality. In Smith’s case, the ultimate reality is 
intertwined with a divinely ordained providential order. In contrast, the 
neoliberal paradigm’s ‘ultimate reality’ lies within the ultimate goal of attaining 
unbridled human freedom. Through the combination of these two factors, the 
Neoliberal economic paradigm will be demonstrated to be thoroughly religious 
in nature.  
 
For neoliberalism to achieve ‘religious’ status, within our definitional paradigm, 
it is first necessary to make explicit its role as a legitimating system. As stated 
above, both in Smith’s system and the neoliberal paradigm, self-interest is the 
core principle, and, is therefore the form of action that is legitimated. This 
becomes evident when Milton Friedman’s core principle for the market economy 
is reflected upon. He states that the central tenant of the market economy is that 
“[i]ndividuals co-operate with others because they can in this way satisfy their 
own wants more effectively.”258 Such an implicit ode to Smith is complemented 
by much more explicit recognition in Free to Choose: A Personal Statement 
(1979). In the introduction to this text, Friedman states that “Adam Smith’s key 
insight was that both parties to an exchange can benefit and that, so long as 
cooperation is strictly voluntary, no exchange will take place unless both parties 
benefit.”259 The quotation hinges on the notion that self-interest is the mode by 
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which humanity can achieve mutual benefit in all facets of life. As such, both 
systems act to legitimate the pursuit of self-interest.  
 
Regardless of the ends, the ideological means, in regards to the ‘ultimate’ reality 
that the legitimation is bound to, for this shared endorsement are markedly 
different. Smith’s championing of self-interest stems from his belief in a 
conception of a divinely ordained providence, which is influenced by his 
Calvinist and Newtonian ideological commitments. Rather than a belief in some 
sort of divine providence, the neoliberal standpoint is influenced by a belief in 
the supreme right and supreme benefit for broader society of human ‘freedom’. 
This belief, moving beyond the titles of texts within the neoliberal canon such as 
Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom (1962) and Von Hayek’s The Constitution of 
Liberty (1960), is made explicit through the founding statement of the Mont 
Pelerin Society. This society consisted of group of economists, philosophers and 
historians who were devout adherents of the philosophy of Friedrich Von Hayek. 
Notable members included Milton Friedman, Karl Popper, and Ludvig Von 
Mises.260 The statement reads: 
The central values of human civilization are in danger. Over large 
stretches of the earth’s surface the essential conditions of human dignity 
and freedom have already disappeared… The position of the individual 
and the voluntary group are progressively undermined by extensions of 
arbitrary power…. The group holds that these developments have 
been…fostered by a decline in the belief in private property and the 
competitive market; for without the diffused power and initiative 
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associated with these institutions it is difficult to imagine a society in 
which freedom may be effectively preserved.261 
The reason for this view, that economic freedom and political freedom are 
intimately wedded, is because “by enabling people to cooperate with one 
another without coercion or central direction, it reduces the area over which 
political power is exercised.”262 In light of this, “by dispersing power, the free 
market provides an offset to whatever concentration of political power may 
arise.”263 In other words, in the neoliberal paradigm, a liberalised economy 
allows people to operate in a mode that is most free of coercive forces. Such a 
mission statement, complemented by Milton Friedman’s assertion that “freedom 
is a rare and delicate plant” and Hayek’s pursuit of “Liberty”, lend weight to the 
assertion that the neoliberal paradigm is bound by an ultimate belief in, and 
championing of the elusive and transcendental concept of ‘freedom’.264  
 
Combining the two assertions above, neoliberalism’s religious nature is explicitly 
obvious. It is a system that prescribes unregulated economic activity, in the form 
of a market economy underpinned by the principle of self-interest, in order to 
attain a state of ‘freedom’, which it views as the ultimate good. Evidently, within 
our definitional paradigm, this is a religious system. Regardless, even for 
conservative definitions, there is no argument against the assertion that the 
notion of ‘freedom’ is a somewhat unattainable, and therefore a transcendental 
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concept. For if it is a general consensus that ideas are derived from worldly 
experience, then we can safely assert that we are driven by external stimulus to 
take the positions we do. If Friedman and Hayek seek a world ‘without coercion’, 
then what leads us in the propagation of our desires and beliefs? Where do we 
gain ideas and desires if not by the push and pull of realities stimuli? Even if the 
individual chooses to answer these questions with a transcendental justification, 
‘freedom’ proper is still left out of the equation. Further, ‘freedom’ is a non-
existent concept for social collectives. For no matter what formation it may take, 
these collectives exert push and pull factors on individuals in order to actually 
create and articulate the individual. For as Berger and Luckmann assert, there is 
no individual without the collective.265 In light of this, ‘freedom’ is not only 
transcendental, in the sense that it relates to some sort of ‘ultimate’ reality’, by 
our somewhat unorthodox definitional paradigm; it is also transcendental within 
an orthodox view of reality. In light of the above assertions, is should be evident 
that neoliberalism is a legitimating system that relates its legitimation to an 
‘ultimate’ reality, and is therefore a ‘secular’ religion.   
 
The dominance of such a paradigm has resulted in what has been dubbed as 
“faith-based policy”.266 In other words, the Western world has arrived at a point 
where the neoliberal paradigm has served its purpose as a legitimating system. 
Self-interest has been completely theoretically rectified in regards to its ability to 
serve the greater good of humanity. One only need refer to the constant ‘free-
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market’ rhetoric, and the derogatory slur of ‘protectionism’. Such developments 
only further this dissertations assertion that it is in fact a ‘secular religion’. 
Conclusion 
By providing an analysis of one of the primary secular religions of the modern 
period, it was possibly to utilise the definitions provided by the previous 
chapters of this dissertation. In light of this definitional undertaking, it was 
possible to utilise two distinct characteristics to identify a ‘secular religion’. 
Firstly, for it to constitute a ‘secular’ ordering narrative, it must be ordered and 
formed by the mechanistic metanarrative of modernity. Secondly, for it to 
constitute a ‘religion’, the system must be a theoretical narrative that serves to 
legitimate the world in reference to an ‘ultimate reality’. By employing these two 
particular characteristics, it was possible to first identify Smith’s classical 
economic paradigm to be both mechanistic, as Smith believed the ‘market’ to 
operate along the lines of specific rules and laws, and as a religion, as it 
legitimated unbridled self-interest in the name of the greatest moral outcome. 
Following this, the modern economic paradigm of neoliberalism was analysed. 
Like Smith’s system, it was mechanistic in the sense that it contends that the 
market operates as a self-regulating entity. Further, it was religious in the sense 
that it legitimised self-interested action in the name of the ultimate reality of 
‘freedom’. In light of this analysis, this chapter conclusively demonstrated 
economics to, within this dissertation’s definitional paradigm, be a secular 
religion. 
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Conclusion: The Extending of the Horizon 
This dissertation has provided clear definitions for the concepts of ‘secular’, 
‘secularisation’, ‘religion’, and ‘secular religion’. It began by addressing ‘religion’ 
in light of the philosophical conclusions of Heidegger and Nietzsche regarding 
the socio-historical construction of concepts of ‘truth’. In the wake of this 
conclusion, Berger and Luckmann’s ‘Social Constructivist’ model of religion was 
shown to be the most apt definitional paradigm. Thus, it was asserted that 
‘religion’ represented a conceptual machinery, or theoretical narrative, that 
sought to legitimate a particular order to the world in reference to an apparently 
‘ultimate reality’. In light of such a system, it was necessary to address Berger 
and Luckmann’s apparent differentiation between a scientific conceptual 
machinery and a religious one. It was concluded that there was no real 
difference, and therefore it was necessary to rethink the concepts of 
‘secularisation’ and the ‘secular’.  
 
Chapter Three provided a clear model regarding the nature of ‘secularisation’, 
and, in light of the model, what the process entailed. Using the conclusions from 
the first two chapters, it was asserted that complex social collectives, that 
contain different groups with differing world-views, are ordered by an over-
arching metanarrative. Following the presentation of this model, the rise of the 
Christian metanarrative and the shift away from it were accounted for. It was 
asserted that the rise of the metanarrative took place with the coronation of 
Emperor Charlemagne in 800CE as this produced an institutional union between 
the Church and the State. This system broke down following the Reformation, as 
the Christian metanarrative was no longer objectively self-evident to the broader 
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collective. 267 Thus, if Europe was to remain an ideologically united continent, it 
was necessary for a new metanarrative to come into being. 
 
Chapter Four concerned itself with making explicit the nature of the 
metanarrative that arose in the place of Christianity. It was asserted that the 
metanarrative of modernity was a causally mechanistic system, which perceived 
the world to be ordered by mathematically derivable rules and laws of nature. 
The rise of such a metanarrative was accounted for through the analysis of 
Galileo’s achievements, the mechanistic philosophy of Descartes, and the 
institutionalisation of natural law within the political system in the form of 
‘human rights’, which came about thanks to Spinoza’s monism. In light of such a 
conclusion, it was then asserted that a ‘secular religion’ was a legitimising 
narrative that was ordered by this causally mechanistic perspective.  
 
Finally, this definition was applied to Adam Smith’s classical economics and the 
neoliberal paradigm in order to demonstrate that economics is a ‘secular 
religion’. This was achieved by showing that these paradigms were both 
mechanistic in nature, in the sense that they operated along the principle of 
‘natural laws’ and rules, and religions, in the sense that they legitimise a 
particular order to the world in relation to an apparently ‘ultimate reality’. In 
regards to Smith’s system, it was shown to be mechanistic due to its employment 
of the concept of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market. In regards to its religiosity, it 
was shown to legitimise a particular order of the world in relation to an ultimate 
reality through its legitimation of self-interested action due to the belief that it 
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achieves the best moral outcome as a result of an overarching providential order. 
The neoliberal paradigm was also mechanistic in the same way that Smith’s 
paradigm was, as it operated along the premise that the market was a self-
regulating entity that operated along the lines of natural laws. Further, it was 
also a religion as it legitimises self-interested action in the name of the ultimate 
concept of ‘freedom’. As such, economics was shown to be a ‘secular religion’.  
 
Two fundamental tasks were achieved by completing this undertaking. Firstly, a 
novel definition of ‘secular’ and ‘secularisation’ was provided. Since 
secularisation is a popular topic in the fields of social science and religious 
studies, it is necessary for it to be clearly and well defined. This dissertation has 
progressed such an undertaking by providing a novel model regarding this social 
process. At the very least, this model can be discredited and rejected in the 
search of furthering the academic discourse. While in the best-case scenario, it 
can be added to the academic toolbox to be employed in garnering 
understanding of religious and ‘secular’ phenomenon in the future. Thus, it is 
obvious that this undertaking has had definite methodological benefits for the 
academy. 
 
The second undertaking that was achieved within this dissertation strays outside 
of the confines of the academy but by no means excludes it. This work intended 
to concern itself with the role of dogmatism in regards to particular world-views 
and paradigms of knowledge. The academy is as guilty as any individual in such 
dogmatism as we often don’t recognise our own ideological commitments. To 
utilise the language of Heidegger, of course we must settle down in horizons of 
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knowledge in order to be able to garner any coherent narrative of the reality that 
we occupy. 268 The problem comes when we do not allow our paradigms to 
extend and shift. Economics provides an excellent example of a stagnation of 
conceptual paradigms. Where economic principles are no longer self-evident, the 
discipline has a tendency to maintain its model of reality. Such dogmatism is 
currently presenting itself in the Euro-crisis, where austerity and labour market 
reforms are being enforced when research proves that these alone do not 
promote growth.269 Thus, the model presented in this dissertation calls for 
reflexivity on our paradigms in the hope that dogmatism can be escaped.  
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